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Abstract  
Between 1990 and 1994 forty-two sub-Saharan African countries began to 
democratize. Prior to this period, many sub-Saharan African countries were characterized 
as neopatrimonial regimes that were highly repressive, often offering little to no political 
participation and opposition. By the end of 1994, of the forty-two countries that began the 
process toward democratization twenty-eight were successful in holding democratic 
elections. Approximately twenty years later democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has seen 
many challenges. Many countries that held founding elections by 1994 soon experienced 
democratic regressions and in some cases full democratic reversal, where a new 
authoritarian regime was imposed.  
In this thesis I assess the progress sub-Sahara African countries have made toward 
democratic consolidation since 1994. Using three cases, Benin, Lesotho, and Malawi, I 
argue that despite periods of regression, many of the sub-Saharan African countries that 
transitioned between 1990 and 1994 are continuing to consolidate democracy and are 
therefore “pre-consolidated” democracies. I use a number of indicators to assess the 
progress made toward democratic consolidation (free and lively political society, 
autonomous civil society, rule of law, usable state bureaucracy, and institutionalized 
bureaucracy) as well as indicators to determine if democratic consolidation will continue 
(inter-institutional insecurity, civil- political unrest, repression, and intra-societal 
insecurity).  
I conclude that despite periods of regression Benin, Lesotho and Malawi are 
indeed “pre-consolidated” democracies that continue to face the challenge of 
authoritarian tendencies. Progress has been made in holding regular elections that are 
 	   v 
generally free and fair but election fraud, undermining of the autonomy of civil society, 
and corruption remain challenges in these countries as well as throughout the broader 
sub-Saharan African region. Furthermore civil-political unrest, and intra-societal threats, 
such as ethno regional divisions and crime, remain challenges to this process of 
democratization.  The challenges I identify can be addressed by first, developing effective 
institutions and second, by developing the political will to resolve disputes through legal 
channels. Institutions such as independent electoral commissions and human rights 
commissions can be used to deepen democracy, and the resolution of disputes through 
legal channels can help minimize the potential for future regressions in democracy. 
Ultimately democratic consolidation is a long process and it will take more time for 
countries in sub-Saharan African to become fully consolidated.
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
The study of democracy has steadily grown following the emergence of the “third 
wave.” The third wave of democracy, beginning in 1974 with the overthrow of the 
Salazar Caetano regime in Portugal and lasting until the 1990s, resulted in a near 
doubling of the world’s democratic governments. Prior to the third wave, there were 
approximately 40 democratic countries globally and by the end there were approximately 
117 democracies.1 The expansion in the number of democratic regimes resulted in an 
increase in the scholarly discourse on democracy, democratization and democratic 
consolidation but this growth in discourse did not immediately result in a growth in 
consensus on the democratization process.  
In 1999 Barbara Geddes outlined only two generally agreed conclusions on 
democratic transition: one, that democracy is more likely to exist in economically and 
institutionally developed countries; and two, regime transitions are more likely to begin 
during an economic downturn.2 In her assessment Barbara Geddes, like most scholars did 
not deal with democratic consolidation. As a result of the lack of focus on the 
consolidation process, there is little about this aspect of democratization. While the 
transition period takes place directly following the fall of a non-democratic regime and 
can be considered to be the process during which the old rules of the political game shift 
to a new set,3 democratic consolidation is the near total acceptance of democracy as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over? An Empirical Assessment.” The Helen 
Kellogg Institute for International Studies (1997): 2. 
2 Barbara Geddes. “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?” Annual Review of 
Political Science 2 (1999): 115. 
3 Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 10. 
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state’s governing system, where no political actors, forces, or institutions consider an 
alternative to gaining power, and there is the absence of any claim of the right to veto the 
decision of any elected representative.4 As noted, this process of democratic 
consolidation has been the focus of only a few scholars, among them Juan Linz and 
Alfred Stepan, as well as Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle.  
As shown by many of the third wave democracies, democratic consolidation is a 
long process that can span the course of decades and is often very difficult to achieve.  
This is evident in the rapid decline in democratic regimes following the third wave. By 
the late 1990s the estimated number of democracies in the world fell from 117 to 30. 5 As 
of 2012, and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index reported a total of 25 
full democratic countries and 54 flawed democracies.6 Of the third wave democracies, the 
former neopatrimonial regimes of sub-Saharan Africa proved to be some of the greatest 
victims of democratic reversal. By the end of December 1994 a total of 42 sub-Sahara 
African countries had begun transitioning to democracy and 28 of those countries were 
able to succeed in having a democratic transition with democratic elections.7 These 
countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, 
Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Sao Tome, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo and Zambia.8 Nearly fifteen 
years following the third wave of democracy, the Economist’s Democracy Index of 2012 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions About Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 7 (1996): 36.  
5 Geddes, “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?” p. 115.  
6 “Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a standstill,” Economist Intelligence Unit, accessed April 17, 
2013 http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-
2012.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex12. 
7 Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, p. 120.  
8 Ibid. 
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reported that the majority of sub-Saharan African regimes were hybrid and authoritarian 
regimes, while 10 were (flawed) democracies (see table 1.1).9  
Table 1.1: Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2012 
2012 Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index: Democracy across regions  
Region No. of 
Countries 
Full 
democracies 
Flawed 
Democracies  
Hybrid 
Regimes 
Authoritarian 
Regimes 
 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
44 1 10 9 24 
Source: “Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a standstill,” Economist Intelligence Unit, accessed April 
17, 2013 http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-
2012.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex12. 
 
In Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative 
Perspective, published in 1997, Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle proposed 
that the majority of sub-Saharan African regimes were neopatrimonial and this 
neopatrimonial classification could influence these regimes’ potential path to democracy. 
The authors defined a neopatrimonial regime as the merger of “patrimonial logic into 
bureaucratic institutions.”10 Published nearly three years following the height of regime 
transitions in sub-Saharan Africa, the work acknowledged that the transitioning 
democracies of sub-Saharan Africa faced economic, international and institutional 
challenges in the process of democratic consolidation. Bratton and van de Walle 
hypothesized that in surviving African democracies; democratic institutions would 
coexist with authoritarian tendencies, or behaviors embedded in neopatrimonial 
traditions.11 These hypothesized authoritarian tendencies can include the undermining of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a standstill,” Economist Intelligence Unit, accessed April 17, 
2013 http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-
2012.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex12. 
10 Ibid, p. 62.  
11 Ibid, p. 234. 
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the rotation of political power, undermining the autonomy of civil society, rampant 
corruption, and the failure to develop institutions.12 If the hypothesis of Bratton and van 
de Walle is correct, could it be the case that due to the neopatrimonial nature of regimes 
in sub-Saharan Africa, democratic transitions and consolidation processes in this region 
take a unique form?  
In this work, I will probe the claim of Bratton and van de Walle that many 
surviving regimes of sub-Saharan Africa possess governing systems where democratic 
institutions coexist with authoritarian tendencies.  However, I will also argue that despite 
this as well as periods of regression experienced during their democratization processes, 
these African regimes are continuing to build democratic institutions that promote 
democratic consolidation and can be considered “pre-consolidated democracies.” 
Regression in this case represents instances where democratic freedoms (e.g.: political 
participation, opposition and civil engagement) or institutions (e.g.: judiciary, legislature, 
executive) were undermined after the democratic transition. Note that while I will not 
propose that all former neopatrimonial regimes, which transitioned between 1990 and 
1994, are at the same level of democratization, I maintain that most remain in the process 
of democratic consolidation.  
To assist my analysis I will select one example of each of three regime variants 
used by Bratton and van de Walle, and characterized as “big-man” neopatrimonial rule: 
plebiscitary one-party systems, military oligarchies, and competitive one-party systems.  
As examples of these regimes I have chosen: Benin, Lesotho, and Malawi.13 These 
examples represent different sub-regions, with differing historical legacies, and different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Diana Cammack, “The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?” Development 
Policy Review 25 (2007): 601- 604. 
13 Bratton and van de Walle, Experiments in Democratic Transitions, pp. 79-81.  
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pre-transition regime types. This approach will consider the vast diversity and variety in 
the democratic experience on the African continent. The three chosen cases have each 
maintained a relatively stable institutional democracy, where elections have been held 
consistently since the democratic transition. However, these regimes have also faced 
challenges of authoritarianism and regression in democratic governance since transition. 
As noted previously regression refers to instances where democratic freedoms (e.g.: 
political participation, opposition and civil engagement) or institutions (e.g.: judiciary, 
legislature, executive) were undermined after the democratic transition. 
In trying to show that these regimes are indeed pre-consolidated, I will refer to 
Linz and Stepan’s five indicators of democratic consolidation, which are: free and lively 
political society, autonomous civil society, rule of law, usable state bureaucracy, and 
institutionalized economic society. A free and lively political society refers to a system 
where democratic institutions such as political parties, elections, electoral rules, political 
leadership, interparty alliances and legislatures are respected, operate freely, and are 
designed to monitor democracy.  An autonomous civil society is characterized by civic 
organizations being free from government control and intervention. The third measure of 
democratic consolidation, rule of law, refers to actors such as those in the government, 
judiciary, and law enforcement respecting and abiding by the rule of law embodied in the 
constitution. The fourth measure of democratic consolidation, a usable state bureaucracy, 
refers to the state being able to protect the rights of its citizens and to deliver basic 
services through the bureaucracy; and the last measure of democratic consolidation, an 
institutionalized economic society, refers to a set of “socio-politically crafted and socio-
politically accepted norms, institutions, and regulations” which mediates between the 
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market and the state. In this work, I hope to find that although the selected African cases 
have variable rankings on the five measures of democratic consolidation these are not 
low enough to preclude the further probability of democratic consolidation.  
Following my discussion of the five measures of democratic consolidation I will 
assess these sub-Saharan African regimes by using four measures to determine whether 
democratic consolidation will continue: inter-institutional insecurity, civil- political 
unrest, repression, and intra-societal insecurity.14  Inter-institutional insecurity refers to 
the inadequacy of regime rules or the unwillingness of regime institutions to mediate 
disputes based on constitutional processes. Civil-political unrest is characterized by social 
disruption over actions of the regime. Repression, which is often linked to civil-political 
unrest, is usually caused by the contestation over illegitimate or unfavorable rules 
enforced by the regime. The final measure, intra-societal insecurity, refers to crime or 
conflict within a society that is not directly linked to actions of the regime.15   
In the next chapter I will review the relevant literature that will inform my work, 
which will include literature on neopatrimonial regimes, democracy, democratization, 
and democratic consolidation. In chapters three through five I will describe the 
consolidation processes in Benin, Lesotho, and Malawi, and then assess the factors 
favoring continued democratic consolidation in these regimes. Following chapter five I 
will conclude by summarizing my findings and suggesting the potential implications for 
the future consolidation processes of neopatrimonial regimes.  
This work is important for the study of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa for 
several reasons. First, the study will provide further elaboration of African democratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Bruce A. Magnusson, “Democratization and Domestic Insecurity: Navigating the Transition in Benin,” 
Comparative Politics, 33 (2001): 214.  
15 Ibid, pp. 214-217. 
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consolidation, an area of study on which more research is needed. Second, my study will 
offer a comparative approach to African democratic consolidation, analyzing three 
regimes with different pre-democratic institutional structures. The research on 
democratization in Africa often uses comparative approaches across regimes with 
similarities either by region, former colonizers, or language and culture. As noted 
previously my study will use three cases across different former neopatrimonial variants, 
geographical regions, culture and language. All in all, my study of African democracy 
offers a balanced approach and analysis across a variety of levels.   
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
In this chapter I will review the relevant literature that will inform my work. This 
review will include literature on neopatrimonial regimes, democracy, democratization 
and democratic consolidation.  
Neopatrimonial Regimes 
Max Weber developed the concept of patrimonialism by studying the governing 
structures of early modern European society. “Patrimonialism” refers to authority 
originating from traditional forms of power, such as the power of the household, which 
was usually ruled by a patriarch. In patrimonial societies, power is discretionary and there 
is no distinction between the powers of the person and the office that the person holds. 
Patrimonialism develops when traditional power structures create institutions as a means 
to exert personal power.1 The familial and traditional components in Weber’s concept of 
patrimonialism are a strong feature in early modern Europe and remain a critical 
component in the concept of neopatrimonialism.2 During the latter part of the twentieth 
century scholars began to adapt Weber’s concept of patrimonialism to modern 
authoritarian regimes. In 1968 patrimonialism as a concept reemerged in “Personal 
Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire Building in New States” where Guenther Roth 
distinguished traditional patrimonialism from personal patrimonialism, characterizing 
personal patrimonialism as a system where the ruler dominates government. This type of 
governance is based on personal loyalties, and material rewards, making it highly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology ed. Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich (Berkley University Press, 1978): 231. 
2 Julia Adams, “The Rule of the Father: Patriarchy and Patrimonialism in Early Modern Europe,” in Max 
Weber’s Economy and Society: A Critical Companion, ed. Philip S. Gorski and David M. Trubek 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005): 238. 
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susceptible to opportunism and corruption. The distinctive feature of Roth’s personal 
patrimonialism is that the government operates based on personal loyalties, which do not 
require any belief in the ruler’s qualifications or supremacy. Roth broke away from 
Weber’s concept by not explicitly ascribing to any of Weber’s forms of authority 
(traditional, charismatic, and legal).3  
The contribution of Roth to the concept of patrimonialism led to the development 
of neo-patrimonialism by Samuel Eisenstadt, and later Victor T. Le Vine, who 
specifically focused his study on Africa. During the post-revolutionary period in Africa, 
political leaders adopted personalist and neopatrimonial characteristics, according to Le 
Vine, as a tool to rapidly construct centralized power.4 Additionally, the neopatrimonial 
nature of states in Africa during the post-revolutionary period was seen to contribute to 
the high degree of political instability.5 Diana Cammack later analyzed the logic of 
neopatrimonial regimes in practice. In neopatrimonial regimes, the primary goal of 
political actors is to gain and maintain power, making the characteristics of democracy, 
such as the tolerance and rotation of political parties in power and an autonomous civil 
society, unsuited to their political motivations. Widespread corruption and the failure to 
develop political institutions are all ways in which these leaders maintain political and 
economic power, and they become widespread in these regimes. In addition to the 
political leader’s desire to stay in power, those outside of the political system view the 
status quo as legitimate - which often stems from a traditional view of leadership and is 
exacerbated by the lack of higher education and an independent media. Voters generally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Guenther Roth, “Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States, “ World 
Politics 20 (1968): 196 -202. 
4 Victor T. Le Vine, “African Patrimonial Regimes in Comparative Perspective, “ The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 8 (1986): 666. 
5 Ibid, p. 673.  
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base their decision on the personality of a candidate and what they believe the candidate 
will provide in terms of social goods, in return for a vote.6  
The concept of neopatrimonialism was also expanded by Bratton and van de 
Walle who differentiated modal paths to democratization based on five regime variants: 
plebiscitary one-party, military oligarchy, competitive one-party, settler oligarchies, and 
multiparty systems. Since my research design will only focus on the regime variants 
described as “big-man,” I will only focus on the plebiscitary one-party, military 
oligarchy, and competitive one-party systems in this section.  
Limited competition and high levels of political participation characterize the 
plebiscitary one-party system. Ritualistic voting occurs to endorse the personalistic ruler 
and/or political party. Election results generally result in an affirmative vote for the ruler 
and/or political party, at a rate of up to 90 percent, but the regime strictly prohibits any 
form of competition. The military oligarchy by contrast, is characterized by exclusion, 
and elections are extremely rare if they occur at all. Political parties and civic 
organizations are also banned, which results in almost no political participation. In this 
variation of neopatrimonial regime, decisions are made by a small group of military 
leaders (junta, committee, or cabinet), often along side civilians, with one leader as the 
figurehead. Competition usually only exists within the military committee, and 
implementation of decisions are carried out by a professional military or civil hierarchy 
through executive institutions.7 
The competitive one party system is as inclusive as the plebiscitary one party 
system but includes greater competition even though the competition is still limited. Two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Diana Cammack, “The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?” Development 
Policy Review 25 (2007): 601- 604. 
7 Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, pp. 77-81. 
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or more candidates are allowed to run for election but voters are restricted to choices 
among candidates from the official political party. As Bratton and van de Walle observed 
in Africa, in situations where there was a long serving leader who institutionalized 
political support, political parties outside of the regime-supported party were allowed to 
exist on the societal fringes.8 These modal paths embody different combinations of 
political participation and competition, making their paths to democratization distinct.  
Throughout the conceptual development of patrimonialism and 
neopatrimonialism, there has been great consensus amongst scholars. However, to ensure 
consistency, I will use the Bratton and van de Walle construct of neopatrimonialism as 
well as three neopatrimonial regime variants.9 Using the regime variants will allow me to 
account for the great deal of variation within different neopatrimonial regimes and 
analyze different ways in which neopatrimonial regimes consolidate into democracy 
Democracy 
Contemporary democratic theory rests on two approaches, a minimalist approach 
and a broader approach. In one of the earliest and most notable contemporary definitions 
of democracy, Joseph Schumpeter defined democracy as “the institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”10 According to Schumpeter the 
primary purpose of those elected is to create a government. Originally written in 1942, 
Schumpeter’s construct of democracy sought to improve on more traditional 
interpretations of democracy, which he saw as incapable of capturing the nature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, p. 80.  
9 Ibid, pp. 61-68. 
10 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper Perennial Modern 
Thought, 2008) 269. 
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democracy as he saw it. Later minimalists such as Samuel Huntington also adopted 
similar definitions of democracy.11  
A broader construct of democratic theory has arguably been most influenced by 
Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy. Polyarchy, defined as a system that has been 
“substantially popularized and liberalized, highly inclusive and extensively open to 
public contestation,” 12 is differentiated from democracy by Dahl, which he believed to be 
an ideal form of governance that is completely or nearly completely responsive to its 
citizens.13 Moving beyond previous minimalist definitions of democracy, polyarchy not 
only consists of the procedural components such as free and fair elections but also 
includes participation, opposition, and civil liberties. Through political participation and 
public contestation citizens are given the opportunity to form civic organizations, choose 
among a variety of political candidates, and express themselves in a political manner 
without fear of government retaliation. Broadened political participation and contestation 
allows for the election of officials that represent different segments of a population; poor 
and middle class voters are more likely to elect representatives that adhere to their social 
and economic needs.14  
Following Dahl’s seminal work, scholars began to further elaborate the concept of 
democracy by differentiating variations and levels of democracy. In “The Paradoxes of 
Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory and Social Dimensions,” Evelyne 
Huber et al show that formal democracy consists of not only procedural components but 
also more advanced forms of democracy, such as participatory and social forms, 
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University of Oklahoma, 1991): 5-13. 
12 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 8.  
13 Ibid, pp. 2-3. 
14 Ibid, pp. 20-21. 
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including higher levels of political participation and mobility, as well as increased 
equality and social and economic outcomes.15 Diamond and Morlino also emphasize a 
broader construct of democracy in the concept of “quality democracy.” In a quality 
democracy the government has a responsibility to satisfy citizens’ expectations of 
governance, ensure extensive political equality and liberty of all citizens, associations and 
groups; and citizens are able to evaluate the government in the context of providing 
liberty and equality based on the rule of law. Political organizations and parties 
participate in the political system to hold elected officials accountable. Ensuring citizens’ 
expectations are fulfilled implies greater political, social, and economic equality.16  
For the purposes of this work I will use the concept of polyarchy as defined by 
Robert Dahl. In assessing regimes that are in the process of consolidating, procedural 
elements of democracy will not be enough. To truly ensure that the cases I have chosen 
(Benin, Lesotho and Malawi) adhere to democratic values and norms, a more 
comprehensive determination must be used that incorporates procedural components as 
well as levels of political participation, opposition and civil freedoms. 
Democratization 
Democratization refers to the study of how states transition from non-democratic 
regimes into democratic regimes. The transition period is the process by which a regime 
shifts from old non-democratic policies to a new democratic set. 17 It is important to 
understand the distinction between the process of a transition and the product of a 
transition, namely the complete democratic transition, which will likely begin the process 
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16 Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, “The Quality of Democracy,” Center on Democracy, 
Development and the Rule of Law: Stanford Institute on International Studies 20 (2004): 5- 6.  
17 Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, pp. 10.  
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of democratic consolidation. A complete democratic transition is when a free and fairly 
elected government is produced based on agreed political procedures. Additionally, a 
transition is complete when the free and fairly elected government has both de facto and 
de jure authority and the branches of government are independent of one another.18 In this 
section I will review literature on endogenous, international and institutional approaches 
to democratization.   
Endogenous Approach 
The endogenous approach to democratization is primarily associated with the 
work of Seymour Lipset, particularly in his seminal work “Some Social Requisites of 
Democracy” that argues that economic growth will enable democratic governance. In his 
study, Lipset concluded that economic wealth is causally related to the development of 
democracy, as reflected in a higher ratio of wealth, industrialization, education, and 
urbanization in more democratic countries.19 Economic development spreads democracy 
by changing the social conditions of the lower class and developing the political role of 
the middle class. Additionally, Lipset implies that there is a linear sequence between 
indicators, with urbanization occurring first, followed by education (literacy), and 
industrialization. This sequence allows for the development of participatory institutions. 20 
Following Lipset’s initial analysis, a number of scholars began to criticize the 
endogenous approach, with the strongest critique coming from Adam Przeworski and 
Fernando Limongi, who concluded that there was no causal relationship between 
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economic development and democratic development. In this analysis, democratization is 
not endogenous but is exogenous, occurring independently of economic development. 
The study concluded that democratic transitions become more likely as per capita income 
increases between $1,001 and $4,000. However the study also showed that at and above a 
per capita income of $6,000, dictatorships become more stable. 21 Additionally, economic 
development does not create democracy, but economic crisis can destabilize democracy.22 
It was shown that the endogenous approach to democratization may serve as an 
explanation for a small number of successful transitions between 1950 and 1990, but 
dictatorships and authoritarian regimes transition to democracy for various reasons.  
International Approach 
Although not traditionally a method of democratization, recent literature has 
begun to link aspects of the international system to democratic transition and 
consolidation. As noted by Hans Peter Schmitz, regime change is a domestic process that 
is exposed to international forces, which are often geared to strengthening the principles 
of democratic governance.23  
Bilateral relationships and foreign aid are areas where the domestic 
democratization process is exposed to international influences. Bilateral engagement with 
transitioning regimes has proved to have varying effects on the democratization process. 
According to Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, high levels of linkage and leverage are 
large contributors to successful democratization, while low levels of linkage and leverage 
have a minimal effect on democratization. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, where 
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linkage is low yet leverage is high, the international influence on democratization has 
been only partially effective, resulting in weakened authoritarian regimes or incomplete 
democracies. 24 Despite the assertion of Levisky and Way, critics of foreign aid have 
argued that aid contributes to a reduction in representative democracy, increasing rents to 
those in control, which allows for the exclusion of citizens.25 Arthur Goldsmith argued 
that foreign aid has had a small impact on the democratization process in Africa, by 
allowing for more responsible governance through conditionality.26 Stephen Knack, who 
analyzed democratization from 1975-2000, showed that democratization did not have a 
strong causal connection with foreign aid.27  
Recent literature on targeted democratization aid has shown that unlike general 
aid packages provided to transitioning countries, targeted democracy assistance has had a 
much greater positive impact on the democratization process of recipient countries.28 
Small amounts of targeted democratization aid in areas such as democratic institution 
building, election support, democratic participation and civil society support are more 
effective in promoting democracy than large sums of economic aid. 29 In the context of 
sub-Saharan Africa, Cammack outlines seven recommendations for donors to maximize 
the promotion of democracy. These recommendations include: understanding the formal 
and informal processes and political context of the recipient country; specifically 
designing interventions in fragile states; specifically supporting projects that promote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Linkage versus Leverage: Rethinking the International Dimension 
of Regime Change,” Comparative Politics 38 (2006): 379-378. 
25 Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, “The Cure of Aid,” Journal of Economic 
Growth 13 (2008): 170. 
26 Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Donors, Dictators and Democrats in Africa,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 39 (2011): 412.  
27 Ibid, p. 262.  
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social and institutional change; specific support for civil society organizations that 
monitor government accountability; and support for programs that increase educational 
awareness both domestically and throughout the African continent.30 According to 
Cammack, understanding the nature of neopatrimonial regimes and developing strategies 
to improve them are integral for the effective use of development aid. 
Institutional Approach 
The institutional approach to democratization focuses on the relationship between 
political institutions and political (democratic) stability, in that the creation of institutions 
facilitates political stability and stabilizes democratic transitions. In Political Order in 
Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington argued that the instability and violence 
experienced by transitioning regimes in the twentieth century were attributable to rapid 
social change with the slow development of political institutions.31 Social and economic 
changes allow for an increased number of political participants but political institutions 
are often not in place to fully facilitate peaceful and meaningful association among 
political participants. According to Huntington a political institution is a mechanism for 
“maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and thus 
promoting community among two or more social forces.” The more complex a society is, 
the more the maintenance of political community relies on the effectiveness of political 
institutions.32 Institutions are stable, recurring patterns of behavior while 
institutionalization is the process by which institutions acquire value and stability. Lastly, 
in his explanation of the utility of political institutions in facilitating political stability, 
Huntington outlines criteria for successful institutions: adaptability, complexity, 
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autonomy, and coherence. These criteria can be measured and used to compare political 
systems in terms of their institutionalization.33  
Following Huntington’s initial analysis, research on this approach remained on 
the fringes of political analysis. Theoretical frameworks that emerged in the 1970s, such 
as dependency, corporatism, and bureaucratic authoritarianism, all but eclipsed the 
institutional approach to democracy. The resurgence of the institutional approach resulted 
from a dramatic reversal in development trends, leaving a gap in theoretical 
explanation.34 This resurgence resulted in a number of important works exploring the 
relationship between political institutions and democracy, including Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation by Linz and Alfred Stepan, and as well as 
Democratic Experiments in Africa by Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle.  
In Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, the authors show how 
the institutional factors of an “old regime” can influence regime transition. The study 
focused on how institutions can define the identities and interests of individuals in a 
society. These interests can then influence the actions of individuals seeking to gain 
political power during a transition. Because regime transitions involve the interaction 
between factions of incumbents and challengers whose motivations are often 
characterized as hardliners/soft-liners, or maximalists/moderates, the understanding of the 
old regime’s political institutions can uncover insight into the origins of these factions.35  
Similarly, in Democratic Experiments in Africa, Michael Bratton and Nicholas 
Van de Walle illustrate three ways in which a non-democratic regime can influence 
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democratization: old regime institutions shape the different paths of regime transitions; 
regime institutions define the role of challengers during a transition; and old regime 
institutions influence the strategy of incumbents. The most important addition to the 
institutional approach made my Bratton and Van de Walle is the idea of different modal 
paths for different non-democratic regimes. This means that democratic transitions in the 
neopatrimonial regimes of Africa will be different from the bureaucratic authoritarian 
regimes of Latin American, distinguishing different non-democratic regimes.36 As noted 
by Richard Snyder and James Mahoney, institutions structure the political interaction in a 
regime, and when a regime changes, institutions change as well.  Additionally, 
institutions will have an important impact on incumbents and challengers seeking to gain 
political power during a transition.37  
After reviewing the endogenous, international and institutional approach to 
democratization, I have concluded that the institutional approach is best suited for the 
study of democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa. Institutional structures interact 
differently between groups, shaping political behavior and outcomes. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, it was these types of institutional structure, such as neopatrimonial regimes, that 
began the wave of democracy throughout the continent. In addition the formal and 
informal institutions of sub-Saharan Africa have shaped the behaviors of political actors 
and have become an independent social force. The democratically elected leaders of sub-
Saharan Africa, directly following transition, were shaped by formal democratic 
structures as well as informal structures like cronyism. Ultimately, to understand the 
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democratic consolidation of Africa, one needs to understand the nature of political 
behavior and thus the institutional approach is best suited for this analysis.  
Democratic Consolidation 
Following a successful democratic transition, a regime begins the process of 
democratic consolidation. According to Linz and Stepan, democracy is consolidated 
when democracy becomes the only game in town. In more concrete terms, democracy is 
consolidated when there is no serious attempt by political groups to threaten the 
democratic regime or secede, when a democracy can survive political and economic 
crisis, and when all relevant stakeholders believe political conflict will be ineffective and 
costly. 38 This definition distinguishes democracies that are consolidated from 
democracies that have merely survived without full institutionalization and socialization 
of democratic norms. Additionally, democratic consolidation is a process without any set 
timetable. Attitudes and beliefs will only be fully converted over time, regardless of 
democratic institutions. A regime can take decades to fully consolidate.39  
Linz and Stepan also establish five inter-related characteristics of consolidated 
democracy, which include: free and lively civil society, autonomous political society, rule 
of law, state bureaucracy that is usable, and institutionalized economic society. 
According to Linz and Stepan a free and lively political society refers to both the 
conscious effort to design a political system where contestation is allowed by political 
actors, as well as a system where these political actors use the right to contest the use of 
power over the public and the state freely. Political society generally consists of 
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institutions such as political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, 
interparty alliances and legislatures. The second measure, autonomy of civil society, 
refers to the autonomy and independence of civil society groups from government control 
and intervention. However, this does not mean that the civil society and the state should 
work separately. Linz and Stepan argue that civil society groups not only play an 
important role in a democratic transition where these groups champion democratic 
reform, but these groups must also play a role where they hold the state accountable to its 
democratic commitments during the consolidation process. The third measure of 
democratic consolidation, rule of law, refers to all significant actors, such the 
government, judiciary, law enforcement and individual citizens, respecting and abiding 
by the rule of law embodied in constitutionalism. In this sense constitutionalism is a 
common understanding of the constitution and commitment to the laws of the 
constitution. The rule of law also must indicate a hierarchy of laws within a state. The 
judiciary must be able to interpret the constitutionality of laws and the judicial system 
must be strongly supported by the legislature and law enforcement.40  
The final two measures of democratic consolidation are less commonly 
understood.  Regarding the fourth measure, a usable state bureaucracy, Linz and Stepan 
argue that in order for a state to protect the rights of its citizens and to deliver basic 
services, the state must monopolize the capacity to command, regulate and extract. 
Therefore in order for a state to command, regulate and extract, a usable bureaucracy 
must be in place. Linz and Stepan used the example of the state as the physical protector 
of its citizens, which requires the state to monopolize the use of force within its territory. 
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In order for a state to monopolize the use of force within its territory that state must hire 
military forces as well as law enforcement officers. To pay for this the state must tax its 
citizens and in order for a state to effectively tax its citizens there must be a usable 
bureaucratic system in place. The last measure of democratic consolidation, an 
institutionalized economic society, refers to a set of “socio-politically crafted and socio-
politically accepted norms, institutions, and regulations” which mediates between the 
market and the state. It is argued by Linz and Stepan that generally democratic 
consolidation cannot take place in a command economy and there has never been, and 
potentially never will be, a consolidated democracy with purely a market economy.41 
Therefore the state must establish an economic society where the economy and market 
forces are regulated and there are accepted rules and norms for economic engagement.    
Two important caveats to Linz’s and Stepan’s theory on democratic consolidation 
are that although a regime may be consolidated this does not preclude the possibility that 
at some point a democratic reversal may occur, and secondly, there are a variety of 
consolidated democracies and although a democracy is consolidated there is continued 
room for growth in the quality of democracy.  
In a more empirical study Milan Svoliks differentiates and compares long-lived 
democracies and transitioning democracies in a study that has important implications for 
the endogenous and institutional approaches to democratization. 42  Svoliks concludes that 
democracies with lower levels of economic development are more susceptible to 
democratic reversal, but the timing of these reversals are correlated with economic 
recession and not merely low levels of economic development. The analysis also found 
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that a history of military and presidential executive rule has a negative effect on a 
regime’s susceptibility to democratic reversal, but institutional factors play a secondary 
role to economic factors. Additionally the age of a democracy is positively associated 
with that regime’s survival. In his analysis Svolik draws important conclusions on the 
democratic consolidation process, including that there is a greater risk of early reversals 
for new democracies and democracies that have survived economic recession are more 
likely to consolidate.43 
As noted earlier, the democratic experiences of sub-Saharan Africa vary widely, 
and the African region continues to face challenges in consolidating democracy. In 
analyzing the potential democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton and van 
de Walle argue that the transitioning regimes of sub-Saharan Africa will face a number of 
challenges, which include economic, international and institutional challenges. Although 
economic and international factors will play a role in the consolidation process, 
institutional factors will be the leading force behind successful consolidation.44 
Institutional legacies will influence democratic consolidation in two ways: first by 
political behaviors being embedded in neopatrimonial traditions, and secondly by the 
relative levels of political competition and participation developed during the post-
colonial period.45 The success of democratic consolidation will rest on the status and 
resources of agents within state, civil society and political society institutions, before and 
during the transition period.  
In “Democratization and Domestic Insecurity: Navigating the Transition in 
Benin,” Bruce Magnusson further develops the idea that domestic insecurity in a new 
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democracy can lead to democratic reversal. Magnusson noted that in new democracies 
insecurity can arise from “uncertainties of democratic processes, new and multiple 
centers of power and decision making, and the incapacities of weak institutions of public 
order.” In other words, insecurity in new democracies stems from the dilemma of regime 
legitimacy. 46 In this analysis Magnusson introduced four measures of democratic 
insecurity, which are: inter-institutional insecurity, civil-political unrest, repression and 
intra-societal insecurity.47 Magnusson defines these measures as follows: Inter-
institutional insecurity is characterized by the inadequacy of regime rules or the 
unwillingness of regime institutions to mediate disputes based on constitutional 
processes. In Africa these disputes often arise over different centers of power seeking to 
assert dominance over one another, and are often heightened due to insecurity over the 
military’s commitment to constitutional guidelines. Civil-political unrest is characterized 
by social disruption over regime institutional processes. In Africa these types of 
disruptions often take the form of large-scale riots. Civil-political unrest helped bring 
about the African democracy wave in the 1990s. Repression, which is often linked to 
civil-political unrest, is usually caused by the contestation over illegitimate or 
unfavorable rules enforced by the regime. Although democracy is supposed to minimize 
repression, in new democracies repression can be caused by the political or economic 
disenfranchisement of minorities. The final measure of domestic insecurity is intra-
societal insecurity, which is characterized by crime or conflict within a society that is not 
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directly linked to actions of the regime, and in Africa can take the form of hostilities 
between cultural or ethnic groups, banditry, vigilantism, and other forms of crime.48  
In his analysis, Magnusson asserts that if a new democracy is to survive it must 
work to prevent destabilizing effects of insecurity through legitimizing the democratic 
process.  In terms of sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries have a history of military 
intervention and single party rule, he states “insecurity in the form of state paralysis and 
an uncertain military response… can be particularly dangerous.” The threat of military 
coup in sub-Saharan Africa remains a constant threat regardless of previous democratic 
success. Additionally in sub-Saharan African countries where there are a variety of ethnic 
groups (e.g.: Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone) it will be important to avoid any type of 
high intensity intra-societal insecurity. Intra-societal insecurity in the context of high 
intensity ethnic disputes have a large potential to cause widespread instability and 
democratic reversal. Lastly, the author noted that a flexible approach in addressing the 
threat of domestic insecurity can provide a means to sustain democratic progress.49  
Assessing democratic consolidation  
In my discussion of the five measures of democratic consolidation (free and lively 
political society, antonymous civil society, rule of law, usable state bureaucracy, and 
institutionalized economic society) and measures of domestic insecurity (inter-
institutional insecurity, civil-political unrest, repression and intra-societal insecurity) I 
will draw on country reports from Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
IREX, Reporters without Borders, the Heritage Foundation, Transparency International 
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as well as other sources.  In this section I will outline the methodology used for the 
sources I will use to assess the democratic consolidation of my chosen cases.   
The Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report measures the state of freedom 
of individuals based on political rights and civil liberties. Countries are scored based on 
10 political rights questions grouped into three sub categories (electoral process, political 
pluralism and participation and functioning of government) and 15 civil liberties 
questions grouped into four categories (freed of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individuals rights). Scores 
are then given on a scale of 0 to 4, where 0 represents the smallest degree and 4 represent 
the greatest degree of rights or liberties afforded in a given country. The total score 
received by a country is then given a rating from 1 to 7 with 1 representing the highest 
and 7 representing the lowest level of freedom. Following this rating process, each set of 
political rights and civil liberties ratings are averaged, which then determines the status of 
“free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” Scores from 1.0- 2.5 are considered free, scores 3.0- 
5.0 are considered partly free and scores ranging from 5.5 to 7 are considered not free.50  
Another source I will use to assess the level of democracy in my chosen cases will 
be the Economist Intelligence Unit’s annual Democracy Index. This index measures 
democracy on a scale of 0 to 10 against five categories (electoral process and pluralism, 
civil liberties, the functioning of the government, political participation and political 
culture). The average of these ratings forms the overall democracy score for a particular 
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country. Once scored, countries are then divided into four types of regimes: full 
democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes.51   
I will use three sources related to civil society: the IREX Media Sustainability 
Index, the World Press Freedom Index, and the Freedom House Freedom of Press Report. 
The IREX Media Sustainability Index, developed in cooperation with the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) assesses five areas, which are: legal and 
social norms that protect and promote free speech and access to public information; 
journalism that meets professional standards of quality; multiple news sources that 
provide citizens with reliable, objective news; well managed media enterprises, allowing 
editorial independence; and supporting institutions that function in the professional 
interests of independent media. A score for each area is created based on either seven to 
nine indicators. The scoring process is conducted by panelists from a variety of media 
outlets, NGOs, professional associations and academic institutions who score each 
indicator on a questionnaire. The IREX reviews the panelist scores and then scores each 
country independently. Final country scores are then determined based on the average of 
those two scores. Countries are scored as follows: 0-1 represents unsustainable, anti-free 
press; 1-2 represents unsustainable mixed system; 2-3 represents near sustainable; and 3-
4 represents sustainable.52   
The World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders is designed to 
measure the freedom of journalists and the media. In 2002, the first year of the index, 
Reports Without Borders distributed questionnaires to journalists and media outlets to 
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record the legal environment of the media and incidents of attacks and punishment. The 
index took into account actions perpetrated against press freedom by governments, armed 
militias, underground organizations and other pressure groups.53 In 2013 the 
questionnaire was changed slightly and did not include questions on human rights 
violations against journalists and media outlets. Nevertheless the index continues to 
consider counts of journalists being “killed, kidnapped, imprisoned, threatened, and 
media organizations censored and attacked.”54 The third source I will use to assess the 
level of press freedom in my chosen cases is the Freedom House Freedom of Press 
Report, which measures the degree to which countries allow freedom of information. 
This report is conducted in a similar fashion as the Freedom in the World Report and 
countries are also classified as “free,” “partly free,” and not free. Countries are scored 
from 0 to 100 on this index, with scores of 0 to 30 being considered free, while countries 
scoring 31 to 60 are considered partly free, and countries scoring 61 to 100 are 
considered not free.55   
The Index of Economic Freedom, which is conducted by the Heritage Foundation, 
analyzes ten components of economic freedom that are categorized into four categories, 
which are: rule of law, property rights, freedom from corruption; limited government, 
fiscal freedom, government spending; regulatory efficiency, business freedom, labor 
freedom, monetary freedom; and open markets, trade freedom, investment freedom and 
financial freedom. These components are scaled on a system of 1 to 100, where the 
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higher score represents more economic freedom. Each component of the index uses its 
own methodology.56  
Lastly, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index scores and 
ranks countries based on the level of perceived corruption in the public sector. Corruption 
is defined as all illegal activities that are deliberately hidden and come to light through 
scandals, investigations or prosecution. The data used in this index derives from 
specialized independent institutions and transparency international reviews and ensures 
the data meets the organization’s standards. The index is scaled from 0 to 100 where 0 
represents a perception of high levels of corruption and 100 represents a lower level of 
corruption. 57 
Conclusion 
The relevant literature on neopatrimonial regimes, democracy, democratization 
and democratic consolidation accounts for a variety of approaches and opinions that all 
contribute greatly to the discourse on democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa. I 
acknowledge that democratization and democratic consolidation are processes that vary 
by country, but despite this, I do maintain that the measures of democratic consolidation 
of Linz and Stepan are the most comprehensive for analyzing the level and degree of 
democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa. These five measures of democratic 
consolidation (free and lively political society, autonomous civil society, rule of law, 
usable bureaucracy, and institutionalized economic society) coupled with Magnusson’s 
four measures of insecurity (inter-institutional insecurity, civil-political unrest, repression 
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and intra-institutional insecurity) will further allow me to assess the potential for 
continued democratic consolidation in Benin, Lesotho and Malawi.  
Using the relevant literature in this chapter I will assess my chosen cases Benin, 
Lesotho and Malawi. In the following three chapters on Benin, Lesotho and Malawi 
respectively, I will review the institutional legacies of these regimes, from independence 
to full transition. Following this review I will then begin to assess the consolidation 
process using the five measures of democratic consolidation. In this assessment I hope to 
find that each case fulfills some measures, but not all. This will validate the claim of 
Bratton and van de Walle, that democracy in former sub-Saharan African regimes will 
possess characteristics of both democratic institutions and authoritarian tendencies. In the 
process I will also review any areas in which regression has taken place. Lastly I will 
assess the extent to which these “pre-consolidated” democratic regimes have the potential 
to continue the process toward democratic consolidation in terms of four measures (inter-
institutional insecurity, civil-political unrest, repression and intra-societal insecurity). I 
hope to find evidence that sustains my argument that although there have been points of 
regression in the democratization processes in Benin, Lesotho and Malawi, it is likely 
that these countries will continue the process toward further democratic consolidation. 
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Chapter 3  
Plebiscitary One Party: Benin 
In 1990 Benin became the first sub-Saharan African country to begin a transition 
to democracy during what is considered the third wave of democracy. Benin is an 
example of a country where democracy has been sustained throughout most of the 
democratization process yet the country is currently undergoing a period of regression. 
With the election of President Thomas Yayi in 2006 and his reelection in 2011, the 
government has begun to infringe on civil liberties such as the freedom of the press. 
Unlike other cases in sub-Saharan Africa where periods of regression have occurred 
during the early transition process, Benin offers a unique case where regression of 
democratic freedoms is occurring more than a decade after its democratic transition 
began.  
In this section I will explore the consolidation process of Benin, as a former 
plebiscitary one party system, and how Benin successfully transitioned into a democracy. 
First I will discuss the challenges Benin has faced with maintaining democracy since its 
independence from France in 1960. Next, I will explore the process of Benin’s 
democratic transition in the 1990s and finally the progress it has made in democratic 
consolidation, using the five measures of democratic consolidation (free and lively 
political society, autonomous civil society, rule, usable state bureaucracy, and 
institutionalized business society). My discussion of the five measures of democratic 
consolidation will end in 2006, when the democratic regression began. In view of this 
regression, I will assess whether the progress achieved earlier in democratic consolidation 
can be sustained, based on four measures: inter-institutional insecurity, civil-political 
unrest, repression and intra-societal insecurity.   
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Post-Independence and Democratic Transition 
From its independence from France in 1960 to its democratic transition in 1990, 
Benin (formerly Dahomey) experienced near constant political instability. Directly 
following independence Benin was led by a civilian government coalition. This coalition 
excluded some ethno-political parties from the electoral process that later led to political 
instability, resulting in a military coup in 1963 by Christopher Soglo, the chief of staff of 
the army.1 For nearly the entire decade following the 1963 military coup Benin 
experienced a period of social and political crisis, enduring multiple military coups.2 
Between 1963 and 1972 political power in Benin continuously shifted between the ethno-
political groups, with neither group dominating the government for long. This extended 
period of crisis resulted in Benin being known as the sick child of Africa.3   
In 1972, the then deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, Mathieu Kérékou, led 
a military coup against the government and began what would be an eighteen-year reign. 
From 1972 to 1990 Kérékou ruled Benin as its leader through a plebiscitary one-party 
system that was characterized by limited opposition and a moderate level of political 
participation.4 Throughout Kérékou’s rule he ensured that he consolidated his political 
power and prevented any true form of political opposition. In an attempt to create a 
Beninese national identity Kérékou renamed the Kingdom of Dahomey the People’s 
Republic of Benin in December 1975.5 Four years after that, in 1979, Kérékou was the 
sole candidate for president unanimously elected by the national revolutionary assembly. 
In 1983 Kérékou then decreased the number of members of the national revolutionary 
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assembly to 196 members. During the next several years Kérékou would often remove 
high-level political leaders that threatened his leadership position.6  
The Kérékou regime was highly repressive of civil liberties.7 Following the 1972 
coup, Kérékou shut down many independent newspapers ensuring no rivalry to his 
party’s daily newspaper “Ehuzu,” which he considered the voice of revolutionary 
militancy. Despite the repressive rule under Kérékou, individuals in Benin continued to 
demand their civil liberties. In 1979 a conference was organized by a variety of groups 
that demanded a return of civil liberties, but the group’s demand was ignored by the 
Kérékou regime. A few years later, in 1985, students protested, also demanding a return 
to civil liberties, but these protests were quickly repressed. The media, which previously 
played a large role in Benin’s culture of dissent was regarded with contempt during the 
Kérékou regime. During a meeting of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Benin, an official of the Kérékou regime expressed 
his opinion of journalists by saying “You are not the first nor the second nor third power, 
not to mention that you will never be fourth or fifth. You are instruments of 
propaganda.”8 
Kérékou would lead Benin until 1990 and the start of Benin’s democratic 
transition, which was the first in sub-Saharan Africa. Maya Soble argues that Benin 
became the first sub-Saharan African country to begin a transition to democracy because 
of the collapse of its political economy, the extent of international involvement and the 
individual charisma of opposition leaders. With the end of the Cold War and Benin’s loss 
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of Soviet aid, the country’s economy collapsed, resulting in Kérékou’s inability to 
maintain his patronage networks, which further weakened his regime.9 Furthermore as 
mentioned in a 1992 New York Times article by Jane Perlez, with the Soviet Union’s 
fall, the United States, began to promote political pluralism and democracy throughout 
the African region, beginning in 1989. The United States promotion of democracy 
encouraged opposition movements throughout the region, and in Benin charismatic 
opposition leaders began to emerge. These leaders excited the public, which led to 
widespread protests and demonstrations. Also, pressure for Kérékou to liberalize by 
France further exacerbated instability in Benin.10 Ultimately the Kérékou regime 
succumbed to the mounting pressure and in December 1989 it was announced that a 
“National Preparation Committee for the Conference of the Vital Force of the Nation” 
would be held in the first quarter of 1990. 
The National Preparation Committee for the Conference of the Vital Force of the 
Nation held its first meeting on 19 February 1990. This national conference resulted in 
the creation of a new constitution, which established Benin as a presidential system, with 
a proportionally represented unicameral legislature. The country was also renamed from 
the People’s Republic of Benin to the Republic of Benin. A Constitutional Court was 
later created in 1993, followed by an independent electoral commission in 1995.11 In 
Benin’s first multi-party elections in 1991, 64 members were elected to a term of four 
years to the National Assembly and Nicephore Soglo, a former World Bank official, was 
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elected President to a term of five years.12 During the Soglo administration, civil liberties 
were expanded to the population at large, and Soglo led a successful economic reform 
program that resulted in the expansion of the Beninese economy. Nevertheless Soglo was 
often unsuccessful in managing the political sensitivities of the government and often 
undermined the legislature by passing decrees independently.13 This was no more 
apparent than in the budget crisis of 1994, where Soglo undermined the authority of the 
National Assembly by using emergency Presidential powers to implement a budget 
constructed on the advice of the World Bank. The Constitutional Court, established only 
a year before the crisis, gave the president a “slap on the wrists” for not adhering to 
proper procedure when enacting emergency powers.14  
In 1996 the former neopatrimonial ruler of Benin, Kérékou, was democratically 
elected to the presidency with 52 percent of the popular vote. 15 Kérékou would later win 
reelection in 2001 and remain President of Benin until 2006. During this first term as a 
democratically elected president, Kérékou reshuffled his cabinet, filling it with many of 
his former loyalists, and dismissed the head of the constitutional court. These actions 
caused many to worry that Kérékou was reverting to neopatrimonial tendencies. 
However, despite these two acts, Kérékou generally upheld the rule of law throughout his 
democratic presidency.16 During the 2001 Presidential elections Benin faced a near crisis 
when Soglo and other opposition groups accused Kérékou of rigging the first round of 
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elections. Soglo argued that there were discrepancies in election results between the 
Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Court and as a result refused to participate 
in the second round of elections. This left Bruno Amoussou, a Kérékou ally, to face 
Kérékou in the second round elections. Kérékou won with 84 percent of the popular 
vote.17   
During the two terms of his democratic presidency, Kérékou adhered to the 
constitution. Under Kérékou Benin’s international reputation continued to improve and 
Benin also took part in multiple United Nations peacekeeping missions throughout 
Africa. In 2005 Kérékou announced that he did not intend to change the constitution to 
allow him to seek reelection. In a statement delivered in 2005, he stated, “The 
constitution favours the change of power and the change of heads of state. These 
fundamental prescriptions of our constitution of 11 December 1990 must resist all 
opportunistic revisionism, short term interests and subjectivism.”18  
In 2006 Thomas Yayi, the former president of the West African Development 
Bank (BOAD), won the presidency with 74.6 percent of the popular vote in the second 
round of elections. Yayi won the election primarily because of his stance on economic 
development and economic reform.19 Four years into his first term, Yayi became involved 
in a Ponzi scheme scandal in which a company known as Investment Consultancy and 
Computering Services (ICC) stole over $140 million from 130,000 people. Prior to the 
scandal breaking out, President Yayi and other government officials appeared with ICC 
officials on televised news bulletins and images used to advertise ICC services. Protests 
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and anger ultimately resulted in more than half of the parliamentarians in the National 
Assembly formally requesting the impeachment of President Yayi.20 In an effort to 
control the situation Yayi began to censor the autonomous press and forced the closure of 
a prominent international media outlet.21  
Less than a year following the Ponzi scheme scandal, in the run up to the 2011 
Presidential election, opposition groups reported potential electoral fraud by the 
government such as ballot stuffing. The international community, including monitors 
from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African 
Union (AU), reported the election as free and fair, despite organizational problems. 
Although the election resulted in Yayi’s victory by a margin of 53.13 percent, opposition 
candidate and former Prime Minister Adrien Houngbedji claimed that the government 
engaged in fraud and voter tampering. One primary area of concern was the 
government’s exclusion of nearly 1.2 million votes due to a new electronic voting 
system. It was argued that due to the exclusion of these votes, Yayi was able to obtain 
enough votes to not require a second round of elections. 22 Despite the arguments made 
by the opposition, on March 20, 2011, the Constitutional Court of Benin confirmed Yayi 
as the winner. During both the Ponzi scheme scandal and the disputed presidential 
elections of 2011, Yayi used his power as president to limit press coverage and infringe 
on the autonomy of the media.  
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Five measures of Democratic Consolidation to 2006 
Free and lively political society  
A free and lively political society refers to contestation being allowed in the 
political system as well as being widely practiced. Prior to its first multiparty elections, 
Benin was a neopatrimonial state and thus characterized by limited political participation 
and opposition. With the transition to democracy and adoption of the Beninese 
constitution in December 1990 the freedom of political society was established. Title one 
of Benin’s constitution firmly supports the free participation of political parties. 23  The 
creation of the National Electoral Commission in 1999 further entrenched the principle of 
pluralism in Benin. Furthermore, the National Electoral Commission tasked with 
monitoring the freedom and fairness of elections in Benin serves as an important 
mechanism to help protect the rights of members within the political society.24   
In addition to the institutional structure being designed to support a free and lively 
political society, Benin has several active political parties. According to the Freedom 
House Freedom in the World Report 1998, it was estimated that Benin had 100 different 
political parties. The quantity of political parties in Benin increases the potential for 
lively and active political participation.25 Furthermore from 1990 to 2006 political parties 
have participated in a series of successful presidential and legislative elections. In 
Benin’s first presidential election 13 candidates participated, representing several 
different political parties. In the 1995 National Assembly elections 19 different political 
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24 “Benin: Freedom in the World 1999,” Freedom House, accessed July 11, 2013 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/benin.  
25 “Benin: Freedom in the World 1998,” Freedom House, accessed July 23, 2013 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/benin.  
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parties participated, 26 and in the 1999 National Assembly elections a total of 53 political 
parties participated. Throughout the period between 1990 and 2006 the role of a free and 
lively political society has been largely respected. For example, although the right to 
assemble and protest usually requires a permit, this was often ignored without 
consequence. During the period between 1990 and 2006 civil society and labor groups 
held a number of protests which were generally peaceful. 27 
The freedom of political parties to participate lively in elections has been upheld 
but political parties have faced challenges in their ability to fully participate in 
governance. An example of this can be seen during the presidency of Nicéphore Soglo, 
who often blocked the participation of members of his own political coalition.28 
Whenever Soglo faced challenges in cooperating with coalition or opposition parties he 
reacted by solidifying power within his own political party and loyalists. These actions 
resulted in a hegemonic tendency of the party over the rest of the coalition government.29 
The lack of political participation of opposition parties during the Soglo administration 
played a part in his failed reelection campaign in 1996. Nevertheless, despite these 
challenges, from 1990 to 2006 Benin was able to maintain a free and lively political 
society, as indicated by 2006 Freedom House Freedom in the World Report.30  
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27 “Benin: Freedom in the World 1998,” Freedom House, accessed July 23, 2013 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/benin. 
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Election,” The Nordic African Institute Online, 
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29 Ibid. 
30 “Benin: Freedom in the World 2006,” Freedom House, accessed December 9, 2013 
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Autonomous civil society 
An autonomous civil society refers to the independence of civic organizations 
from the government and the lack of coercive influences from the government that would 
infringe on that independence. The 1990 constitution, in article 25, 31 has established 
freedom of expression of all civic organizations. Civil society groups have generally been 
instrumental in serving as political watchdogs and have attempted to improve the 
prosecution of high profile individuals.32 As a part of being a political and human rights 
watchdog, civil society groups have also worked to train Beninese professionals on 
human rights. As an example, in 2001 the National University of Benin hosted a 
workshop to train teachers, lawyers, security officials, and journalists on basic human 
rights.33  
Since the democratically elected presidency of Kérékou in 1996, the government 
has co-opted some leaders of civic watchdog groups into the government. Due to this 
close relationship between civil society groups and the government, the reputation of 
Benin’s civil society as being strong political watchdogs has diminished.34 However, civil 
society groups continued to remain very active from 1990 to 2006. One of the largest 
forms of civil participation in Benin is involvement in labor unions. The right to join a 
labor union is constitutionally guaranteed, and since the approval of labor laws in 1999, 
strikes and collective bargaining have been legalized. According to the 2002 Freedom 
House Freedom in the World Report on Benin, approximately 75 percent of wage earners 
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33 “Benin: Freedom in the World 2012,” Freedom House, accessed July 23, 2013, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/benin.   
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belong to a labor union. Furthermore, due to lobbying by civil society groups Beninese 
law has banned employer retaliation against employees on strikes and the government has 
worked to effectively enforce this law.35  
 The freedom of the media in Benin is also constitutionally respected and 
journalists are provided protection under the law. Benin’s constitution reads, “freedom of 
press shall be recognized and guaranteed by the state. It shall be protected by the High 
Authority of Audio-Visuals and Communications under conditions fixed by organic 
law.”36 Private media groups are allowed to exist and have been generally instrumental in 
providing a mechanism to hold the government accountable for its actions.37 During this 
period, 1990 to 2006, Benin was heralded as being one of the most liberal and open 
countries regarding the freedom of press. By 2006 Benin was ranked 23rd of 168 
countries by Reporters Without Borders on its annual Press Freedom Index. Not only was 
Benin the highest ranked African country on the index, Benin also scored higher than 
many well consolidated democracies such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
France and the United States to name a few (see table 2.2).38 
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 Table 2.2: Press Freedom of Select Countries  
World Press Freedom Index 2006 
Country Rank  
(out of 168) 
Benin 23 
United Kingdom 28 
Australia 35 
France 37 
United States 56  
Source: “World Press Freedom Index 2006,” Reporters Without Borders: For Freedom of Information, 
accessed July 23, 2013, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2006,35.html. 
 
Rule of law 
The rule of law refers to government institutions such as the judiciary and law 
enforcement upholding and enforcing the law based on constitutionality. The concept of 
the rule of law is referenced several times in Benin’s 1990 constitution. The constitution 
notes in article 16 that individuals may not be arrested for an act unless that act is deemed 
a crime under the law. Furthermore articles 17 through 19 address the treatment of 
criminals and deem torture illegal. The concept of the separation of powers between the 
branches of government is also enshrined in the constitution. Article 58 mentions that the 
president of Benin can make decisions only after consultation with the President of the 
National Assembly and the President of the Constitutional Court.39  
The judiciary in Benin, specifically at the national level, has kept strict adherence 
to the rule of law since the 1990 democratic transition. The human rights and civil 
liberties of individuals have been upheld throughout this period in Benin. The 
Constitutional Court has also used the power of judicial review to defend the Beninese 
constitution against unconstitutional laws.  Furthermore on a number of occasions the 
constitutional court has ruled against the president and the parliament in order to uphold 
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the Beninese constitution.40 As a means to ensure judicial independence and 
effectiveness, in 2000 a judicial training center for lawyers was established in Benin, 
which sought to train lawyers on proper procedure.41  
Despite the large role the Constitutional Court has assumed in promoting the rule 
of law, there are a number of challenges Benin continues to face. First the torture of 
prisoners heavily undermines the rule of law. According to a 2004 report of the 
Federation Internationale des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), torture was used frequently in 
Benin with suspects detained and its use would often go unpunished. Furthermore, 
according to a 2005 report conducted by the United States Department of State on Human 
Rights Practices, there were a number of incidents where suspected criminals were held 
over the 48 hour limit, prior to seeing a judge, and in some cases suspects were held up to 
a week. Furthermore the report indicates that holding suspects indefinitely is used as a 
tactic for law enforcement and up to 75 percent of detained suspects were in the pretrial 
phase.42  
Another challenge Benin faces in upholding the rule of law is women’s rights. 
Violence against women, female genital mutilation (FGM), and discrimination are among 
the crimes that are legally banned but remain practiced, due to the lack of enforcement. 
Many crimes against women are not reported due to a normative “code of silence,” which 
sees this form of violence as a family matter, out of the purview of the government.43 
Lastly, the widespread corruption in Benin has also undermined the role of the judicial 
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system in promoting the rule of law.  Low salaries for judicial employees have made 
many susceptible to corruption. As an example, in 2004 a trial took place of 45 court 
clerks that allegedly embezzled funds from the judiciary. This case involved 12 of 
Benin’s 13 court districts.44 The corruption in the judicial system also results in long 
delays in the prosecution of high-level officials.  
Usable state bureaucracy    
A usable state bureaucracy refers to the state’s ability to protect the rights of its 
citizens and to deliver basic services, such as to monopolize the capacity to command, 
regulate and extract.45 Since the transition to democracy Benin has faced a number of 
challenges in institutionalizing its state bureaucracy. As noted in a report of the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on Benin and its democratic consolidation, which 
covered the period from March 2004 to January 2008, the Beninese state bureaucracy 
was characterized as “heavily politicized and unprofessional.”46 Institutional corruption 
has been a primary challenge for Benin for decades, and continues to be a major 
hindrance to creating a usable state bureaucracy. According to the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index for the year 2006, Benin ranked 121 of 163 
countries. In this index Benin was ranked with countries that are widely considered 
corrupt, such as Russia, and Rwanda.47 Corruption between citizens and the state 
bureaucracy take the form of “commissions paid for illicit services; fees for public 
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services (e.g. at health clinics); gratitude’s (bribes) given to public officials to perform 
their duties; ‘string –pulling’ or using connections to access administrative services; 
levies at customs or policies outposts; abuse of office; and misappropriation.”48 Due to 
the high levels of corruption the state bureaucracy has been highly inefficient.  
Beginning under Kérékou, the Beninese government has attempted to combat 
corruption through a variety of measures, including the ratification of international and 
regional conventions, such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the 
African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating Corruption and the 
Directive on the Fight Against Money-Laundering 2002, of the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union.49 At the domestic level Benin also restricts illicit activity in the 
Criminal Procedures Code of the Beninese constitution and through the Observatoire de 
Lutte contre la Corruption, the national agency to address corruption.50 Additional 
measures were also established after 2006, to simplify procedures in doing business as 
well as reducing illicit activity. These institutional mechanisms to combat corrupt and 
illicit activity in the state bureaucracy have had varying effects on corruption in Benin, 
but corruption continued to undermine overall democratic consolidation between the 
periods 1990 to 2006.51  
Institutionalized economic society  
An institutionalized economic society refers to “socio-politically crafted and 
socio-politically accepted norms, institutions, and regulations.”52 Since 1990 Benin has 
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made some progress towards creating accepted economic norms, institutions and 
regulations. At the time of the democratic transition the banking system in Benin had 
collapsed and civil servants had gone unpaid for approximately one year. Furthermore the 
poor human rights record Benin had prior to democratization resulted in a reduction in 
foreign investment. Soglo came into office and attempted to improve Benin’s economic 
health by institutionalizing some components of the Beninese economy. Soglo worked to 
improve the public finances, restore confidence in the banking system, and secure steady 
economic growth. In 1994, Soglo along with regional and international partners such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), agreed on a 50 percent devaluation of the 
Beninese currency, the CFA franc. The devaluation aimed to enhance the 
competitiveness of CFA economics (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, and Togo) as well as encourage investment, which would lead to higher 
economic growth rates. 53 During this period, Soglo’s goal to improve the overall 
economic outlook and expand the Beninese private sector was moderately successful. 
One year following the devaluation of the CFA, Benin’s economy grew by 3.4 percent. 54  
Following the 1994 devaluation of Benin’s currency the government worked to 
strengthen financial institutions, regulations and norms. In a report conducted by the IMF 
four years after the 1994 devaluation of Benin’s currency, it is suggested that the 
devaluation was successful, producing a real GDP growth of 5.5 percent along with 
growth in food production, construction, trade and transportation. Some of this growth 
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was attributed to government measures to strengthen the tax and customs 
administration.55 However starting in 2003 economic growth in Benin slowed, which the 
IMF reported to be a result of slow progress in addressing economic vulnerabilities and 
delays in implementing structural reforms.56 One of the industries that structurally 
reformed slowly was the cotton industry, which accounts for approximately 40 percent of 
the economy and 80 percent of exports.57 By 2006 the privatization of the cotton sector 
was only partially complete and there was resistance toward further privatization.58  
The trade and financial sectors in Benin have progressed greatly since 1990. 
Because Benin is a member of international and regional trade agreements, the Beninese 
trading system has been widely liberalized. Benin in fact has had the lowest trade barriers 
of all West African countries and foreign trade accounted for approximately 47 percent of 
GDP as of 2006. Additionally by the end of 2006 the financial sector in Benin had 
developed greatly. Private banks dominated the financial sector and their operations 
conformed to international standards. The banks primarily lend for short and medium 
terms due to the lack of efficient loan recovery mechanisms.  Microcredit has also been 
developing and as of 2006 has had a growing role in financing small businesses.59  
Despite progress made in institutionalizing its economic society, Benin has 
experienced challenges. In 2005 the Index of Economic Freedom, conducted by the 
Heritage Foundation, ranked Benin 128 of 161 countries and classified Benin as a 
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“mostly free” economy.60 Among the indicators used, Benin scored lowest on trade 
policy, government intervention, and regulation. Furthermore the 2006 BTI country 
report stated that under the Kérékou administration, from 1996- 2006, there was a 
definitive lack of strategic planning. During this period there was no strategy developed 
to coordinate or bind different sectors, in order to maximize economic potential. 
Strategies to improve regulation of trade, specifically illegal trade have failed due to a 
lack of political will, which is also true for the modernization of the civil service. The 
BTI country report argued that the Kérékou administration was more concerned about 
exploiting political weakness than about proactive intervention. Furthermore this report 
argued that reforms that would have improved the economic norms, institutions and 
regulations were unlikely to be done under the Kérékou government.61  
Lastly, corruption has been a large challenge for the institutionalization of Benin’s 
economic society. As mentioned previously, the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2006, 
by Transparency International, ranked Benin 121 of 163 countries.62 Furthermore 
according to the 2005 report of the World Bank on Benin’s Investment Climate, 
approximately 8.5 percent of revenue from firms that operate in Benin disappears due to 
informal payments. Additionally, 85 percent of businesses consider corruption a major 
impediment to doing business in Benin. The privatization of domestic corporations in 
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Benin has also resulted in the creation of monopolies and oligopolies and as of 2006 no 
government policy was made to address this. 63  
Democratic Regression 
Thomas Yayi Boni, the current president of Benin was elected in 2006 under a 
platform to improve transparency, fight corruption, and to decentralize the government 
and privatize state companies. However, under Yayi there has been a regression in 
democracy, specifically in terms the autonomy of the media. The drop in media and press 
freedom directly corresponds to the sharp drop in ranking in the World Press Freedom 
Index of Reporters Without Borders. As shown in table 2.3, which outlines a multi-year 
rank of Benin on the World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders, during 
the Yayi administration Benin has fallen nearly 70 places in rank from 23 in 2006 to 91 
in 2011-2012. However, incidents of repression of the press seemed to have subsided 
slightly in 2013 and Benin increased its rank by 12 places.  
Under the Yayi administration the government has exerted a great deal of 
influence over the autonomous media. There have been a number of cases of the 
government shutting down media outlets, including the highly regarded international 
radio station, Radio France Internationale (RFI).64 In 2011 the government also forced the 
closing of the daily newspaper Le Beninois Libere.65 These closures corresponded with 
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Unit, World Bank Group, accessed July 25, 2013, http://www-
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63 “Benin Media Sustainability Index (MSI),” IREX, accessed December 6, 2012 
http://www.irex.org/system/files/u105/Africa_MSI_2010_Benin.pdf.  
64 “Benin press regulators halt publication of daily Le Beninois libere,” Reporters Without Borders, 
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two highly politicized scandals: the 2010 ponzi scheme scandal and the 2011 disputed 
presidential election results. 66  
Table 2.3: Press Freedom in Benin by year 
World Press Freedom Index: Benin 
Year Rank  
 
 
2006 23 (out of 168) 
2008 70 (out of 173) 
2010 70 (out of 178) 
2011- 2012 91 (out of 179) 
2013 79 (out of 179) 
 
Source: “World Press Freedom Index 2006,” Reporters without Borders: For Freedom of Information, 
accessed July 23, 2013, http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=35. “World Press 
Freedom Index 2008,” Reporters Without Borders: For Freedom of Information, accessed July 23 2013, 
http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=33. “World Press Freedom Index 2010,” 
Reporters Without Borders: For Freedom of Information, accessed July 23, 2013, 
http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1034. “World Press Freedom Index 2011-2013,” 
Reporters Without Borders: For Freedom of Information, accessed July 23, 2013, 
http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1043.  “World Press Freedom Index 2013”, 
Reporters Without Borders: For Freedom of Information, accessed July 31, 2013 http://en.rsf.org/press-
freedom-index-2013,1054.html.     
 
Following the disputed presidential election of 2011, the government also banned the 
National Radio and Television Office of Benin, and a private television channel, from 
reporting on the presidential election. 67 Furthermore, in 2012 the High Authority for 
Radio, Television, and the Media (HAAC) reportedly became more repressive in its 
campaign to “sanitize” the media. In this campaign the HAAC issued temporary bans for 
a number of daily newspapers as well as a permanent ban for the periodicals Le Béninois 
Libéré, L’Actu Express and Aujourd’hui au Bénin. The government prevented the 
allocation of any new radio frequencies, which prevented the emergence of any new news 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 “Freedom of the Press: Benin,” Freedom House Online, accessed October 29, 2012 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/benin.   
66 Ibid.   
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related radio stations.68 In addition to the repression, which continues to be experienced 
by a variety of media outlets, it was reported in 2010 that the government had began to 
directly regulate the content of television by appointing government leaders to lead the 
editorial direction of private television stations.69 
The repression of the media undermines there ability to report autonomously 
without government reprisal, which has left the media unable to hold the government 
accountable. Individual journalists have also been subject to this repression as well. In 
2012 the High Authority for Radio, Television and the Media (HAAC) issued sanctions 
against five individuals who were forbidden for life from practicing journalism; three 
were sanctioned due to alleged violations of the code of ethics and two were sanctioned 
due to attempted fraud resulting in a prison sentence of six months. 70 In 2010 and 2011 
there were increasing reports of violence against journalists from police and security 
forces. These reports included a journalist and photographer being beaten by police 
during protests following the 2011 presidential election. The police officers who 
committed this crime were given warnings and no additional disciplinary action was 
taken. 71 
Although Benin is undergoing a regression in terms of the autonomy of the civil 
society, some progress has been maintained in other areas. For example political 
participation remains lively and according to the CIA World Factbook 2012 Benin has 
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69 “ECOWAS said concerned about tension in Benin following poll result publication." BBC Monitoring 
Africa - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. March 22, 2011 Tuesday, Accessed: October 
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over thirty registered political parties with thirteen being considered major parties.72 In 
terms of the rule of law, according to the 2012 BTI country report on Benin, the eight 
judges of the constitutional court, elected in 2008, have served without any apparent bias 
toward any branch of government or political affiliation and since the judges’ 
appointment, the court been more autonomous.73 However, a great deal of progress has 
not been made in establishing a usable state bureaucracy and institutionalizing an 
economic society since the regression began in 2006. According to the 2012 BTI country 
report on Benin the performance of the bureaucratic system is not always efficient due to 
general administrative weakness and lack of resources, and Benin has not yet established 
an institutionalized bureaucratic system.74  Furthermore the 2012-2013 Global 
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, stated that corruption remains 
the most problematic factor for doing business in Benin, followed by access to financing 
and tax rates.75 
Factors favoring continued democratic consolidation 
From the assessment of the five measures of democratic consolidation, it is clear 
that there are some measures on which Benin has performed weakly from 1990 to 2006. 
The regression under President Yayi, which has taken place since 2006, further provides 
an additional challenge to Benin’s continued democratic progress. Considering that Benin 
is currently undergoing a regression, what is the likelihood the country will continue to 
consolidate democracy? In the following section I will assess the factors that may lead to 
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Benin’s continued democratic consolidation based on inter-institutional insecurity, civil-
political unrest, repression, and intra-societal insecurity.  
In terms of inter-institutional insecurity and civil-political unrest, Benin does not 
face any likely theat. Inter-institutional insecurity refers to the inadequacy of regime rules 
or the unwillingness of regime institutions to mediate disputes based on constitutional 
processes, and civil-political unrest refers to social disruption over regime institutional 
processes.76 Benin has achieved a relatively free and lively political society, and despite 
incidents of protest there is widespread respect for government institutions. Regarding the 
legitimacy of regime rules, the 2012 BTI country report states that democratic institutions 
in Benin are respected as legitimate and democracy is a symbol of national pride. 
Additionally the state fully monopolizes the use of force throughout its territory so there 
is no competing source of authority in Benin.77 Furthermore the attempted impeachment 
of Yayi is an example of government institutions working within the constitutional 
process. Instead of launching a coup against Yayi, members of the National Assembly 
sought to legally remove the president through an impeachment process.  
Regarding civil-political unrest, although there have been isolated incidents of 
protests in Benin, especially those following the closure of major media outlets during the 
Ponzi scheme scandal and electoral irregularities in 2011, these protests do not appear to 
have threatened the general democratic progress of Benin. After the use of tear gas and 
violence following the confirmation of President Yayi’s victory in 2011, Yayi convened a 
national consultative meeting with representatives from opposition parties and civil 
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society with a goal of preventing election related disputes, which worked to alleviate 
tension among political groups.78  
Regarding the measure of repression, as stated previously, the increasing 
repression in Benin, specifically of the press is worrisome. Since 2006 the media 
generally as well as individual journalists have been victims of regressive actions as 
mentioned earlier. Furthermore, according to the most recent report of the Freedom 
House Freedom in the World, in 2012 the HAAC under the order of President Yayi 
suspended a private television station for “undermining national unity.” If this trend 
continues, repression will remain a problem for Benin throughout the presidency of 
Yayi.79  
The final measure I will use to assess the continued process toward democratic 
consolidation in Benin is intra-societal insecurity, which refers to crime or conflict within 
a society that is not directly linked to actions of the regime. According to the 2012 
country report on Benin of the United States Bureau of Diplomatic Security (OSAC), 
Benin has a high rate of crime with increasing rates of violent crimes, and drug 
trafficking is on the rise.80  Benin’s rate of homicides has increased from 3.7 per 100,000 
people in 1998 to 15 per 100,000 people in 2008,81 and many of these deaths can be 
attributed to the increase in small arms trafficking. In 2008 the Integrated Regional 
Information Networks (IRIN) reported that the weapons being trafficked are often not 
made in Benin but are smuggled from other countries. In 2006 the Beninese anti 
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trafficking commission seized 4,000 weapons but believed that was a small fraction of 
the weapons available to citizens.82 Drug trafficking has also increased in Benin. Due to 
government inaction Benin is currently being used as a trafficking hub, where drugs are 
transported from Africa to the Americas. 83  In 2012 a joint ECOWAS- Interpol drug 
operation seized nearly 8 million kilograms of different drugs in Benin, Togo, and 
Ghana.84 Crime appears to be a constant challenge in Benin and police are unable to 
control the level of crime in the country.85 According to the report of the United Nations 
Office on Drug and Crime on Crime and Instability crime poses a threat to political 
stability due to the high rewards of crime. Large monetary rewards can be traded for 
government cooperation or ambivalence, which undermines rule of law and increases 
corruption.86  
Although Benin is not engaging in any wars or aggressive acts against any states, 
the threat of Islamic extremism from neighboring Mali may cause a threat to Benin’s 
stability and democratic progress. In March 2012 a military coup took place against the 
President of Mali, Amadou Toumani Toure, which overthrew the democratically elected 
government. This coup destabilized Mali’s institutional structures and later allowed for 
Islamic extremist groups to grab control over nearly half of the country.87 As of February 
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2012, Benin had been participating in a French-led international military intervention in 
Mali. According to the United States Department of State Islamic extremist groups in 
Mali have called for the attack and kidnapping of Westerners in those countries 
participating in the international intervention.88 Although the kidnapping of Westerners in 
Benin would not directly threaten the democratic progress the country has achieved, the 
spread of hostilities across the Mali and Benin border may have stronger impacts. After 
all, it was the unintended consequences of the Libyan independence movement and war 
against Muammar Qaddafi that resulted in the current instability in Mali. Weapons and 
fighters from the war and Libya easily crossed the border between Libya and Algeria and 
later into Mali.89  As the hostilities between the international interventionists and Islamic 
extremists unfold Benin can face instability via intra-societal insecurity.  
Conclusion 
In sum, Benin has managed to create some democratic institutions even while 
neopatrimonial vestiges remain evident. Benin has indeed established a free and lively 
political society but there are many challenges Benin currently faces in establishing the 
rule of law, a usable state bureaucracy and an institutionalized economic society. 
Furthermore due to the continued regression in democracy the autonomy of civil society 
is undermined. Although Benin has not fulfilled all measures of democratic consolidation 
it appears that the progress achieved so far is likely to continue. A positive indication that 
Benin is likely to continue the process of democratic consolidation can be seen in the 
2011 Afrobarometer, where 76 percent of Beninese citizens mentioned their preference 
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for democracy over any other form of government, and 43 percent of Beninese citizens 
believed Benin is a democracy with minor problems.90 Overall, I believe that these factors 
support the fact for Benin being described as a “pre-consolidated” democracy. However 
in order for Benin to become a fully consolidated democracy, the regression of civil 
society as well as corruption and crime will need to be addressed. 
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Chapter 4  
Military Oligarchy: Lesotho 
As a former military oligarchy, the Kingdom of Lesotho experienced a very 
repressive form of governance that offered no political participation and no political 
opposition. Following the 1993 democratic elections, it appeared that Lesotho’s 
democratic government would crumble and reverse progress completely by being 
replaced by another military regime. Nevertheless, despite the challenges Lesotho faced 
during its early democratic life, Lesotho is now considered one of the most democratic 
countries in all of Africa. Lesotho offers a good case of a sub-Saharan African regime 
where democracy was maintained despite deep-rooted distrust among various groups. 
Lesotho also serves as an example of how a regime with little to no prior experience in 
social freedoms can begin the process of democratic consolidation. Due to the near 
democratic reversal of 1998, my discussion of the five measures of democratization will 
begin in 2002, at which time Lesotho’s democracy began to stabilize.  
Post-Independence, Democratic Transition and Regression 
The Kingdom of Lesotho, formerly Basutoland, is one of Africa’s last remaining 
monarchies. The transition to democracy in 1993 established Lesotho as a constitutional 
monarchy, where the monarch serves as the head of state and the Prime Minister serves 
as the head of government.1 Since Lesotho’s independence from the United Kingdom in 
1966, there has been consistent political instability. As Leslie Gumbi states in “Instability 
in Lesotho: A Search for Alternatives,” coups were the primary outcome after periods of 
instability in Lesotho following independence. These coups were often brought about by 
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resistance to political change or as an effort to change the government based on the 
preferences of a particular group at the time.2 Lesotho held its first parliamentary 
elections in 1965, one year prior to its independence, and formed its first democratic 
government, which lasted until 1970. Following this brief period of electoral democracy, 
Lesotho experienced a democratic reversal where the ruling political party in leadership 
established a de facto single party authoritarian regime. This single party regime became 
highly repressive of political and human rights. Nevertheless due to consistent conflict 
within the single party as well as international pressure, the military dismantled the single 
party regime and imposed a military oligarchy from 1986 to 1993.3  
 During the period between 1965 and 1970, Lesotho was a multiparty electoral 
democracy that was almost identically modeled after Britain’s Westminster system. In the 
1965 elections four political parties participated, the Basotho National Party (BNP), the 
Basoutoland Congress Party (BCP), the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), and the 
Marematlou Party (MTP). This election resulted in the BNP winning the majority of 
parliamentary seats with 42 percent of the vote. The BNP subsequently created the first 
democratic government in Lesotho with Chief Leabua Jonathan as Prime Minister. 
Despite the institutional challenges, which limited the effectiveness of the Westminster 
system, Lesotho did not experience any large political problems during this period. As 
Khabele Matlosa argues “the first five years of independence (for Lesotho were) 
generally marked by legitimate and constitutional rule, political stability, rule of law and 
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political tolerance.”4 Nevertheless this changed following the elections of January 1970 
when the opposition party, the BCP won the election. The BNP lost the 1970 election due 
to its repression of traditional power structures, including those loyal to the monarch and 
traditional chiefs.5  
After the BNP refused to recognize its electoral defeat a state of emergency was 
issued by the government, and the constitution was later suspended. King Moshoeshoe II 
was sent into exile in Holland and the BNP ruled by decree with support of the military, 
which used force to prevent a change in political power.6 As argued by Khabele Matlosa 
the democratic reversal of 1970 was due to weak governance structures, democracy not 
being institutionalized, and the confrontational nature of the BNP.7 During the period of 
one-party rule, the BNP used intimidation and the threat of communism to legitimize 
issuing the state of emergency and from 1970 to 1986 Lesotho was a de facto single party 
system. As the BNP solidified its political power, patronage networks began to solidify 
within the party, which were used to gain and maintain support.8 Another result of the 
BNP “high jacking” the 1970 election, was the fragmentation of social cohesion. Despite 
Lesotho being nearly completely ethnically homogenous, political polarization divided 
the society.9 
Under the BNP, the activities of other political parties were also outlawed and 
conflict was no longer resolved through democratic institutions but by force. The one-
party regime and an armed wing of the BCP known as the Lesotho Liberation Army 
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(LLA) were consistently in conflict. External influences such as South Africa also played 
a critical role in this period, with South Africa supporting the LLA with funds and 
weapons.10 Following a failed election attempt in 1985, on 20 January 1986 the military 
overthrew the government and ended the single party regime. The military coup of 1986, 
led by General Justin Lekhanya, was prompted by continued violent political upheaval.11 
Prime Minister Jonathan was arrested and the LLA disbanded the BNP’s Youth League, 
which often engaged in vigilante activities. Also, political prisoners were freed and King 
Moshoeshoe II was returned from exile. 12  
Although it was initially thought that the military regime would bring about a 
return to democracy, the regime further institutionalized oppression of political and 
human rights. King Moshoeshoe II ruled the country through a military council chaired 
by Lekhanya, but Lekhanya was Lesotho’s de facto leader. The parliament and political 
parties were suspended and no formal political participation existed. The military regime 
soon entrenched its authority through violating the rule of law, abusing human rights, and 
completely undermining the democratic process. Leslie Gumbi argued that due to the 
immense authority the military regime possessed during this period “regulating civil-
military relations would be near impossible for any future government.”13 Although the 
relationship between the military and the monarchy was strong at first, in 1990 King 
Mashoeshoe II was exiled and dethroned because of his continued criticism of the 
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military council, specifically regarding corruption, violations of human rights, and 
undemocratic practices.14 Shortly thereafter, his son was crowned as Letsie III.  
Despite the oppression that existed throughout the military oligarchy, it was 
during this period that civil society groups began to emerge, albeit weak. These groups 
became a political lobby for democratic governance and respect for human rights and 
greatly contributed to Lesotho’s return to democracy. 15 By 1990, due to domestic 
pressure General Lekhanya began to make promises of a return to democratic rule but in 
1991 Lekhanya was removed and replaced by Major-General Ramaema who continued 
his predecessor’s democratic program.16 In 1992 the leaders of the military regime sought 
to create a new constitution and formed a constituent assembly tasked with developing 
the constitution. The assembly consisted of members of the military and civil society, 
among other stakeholders. Political parties were not initially members of the assembly 
but by the end of negotiations several groups were allowed to participate. The 
negotiations resulted in the establishment of Lesotho as a constitutional monarchy and led 
to the end of the military oligarchy in 1993 through multiparty legislative elections.17  
The Lesotho constitution of 1993 outlines a number of freedoms that were not previously 
respected under the previous neopatrimonial regime, including the right to a fair trial of 
people charged with criminal offenses and to a fair determination of civil rights, the right 
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of equality before the law and equal protection, and the right to participate in 
government.18  
The return of political participation to Lesotho did not temper many of the 
hostilities that existed between the different stakeholders in Lesotho’s society prior to 
transition, specifically between the military and civilian government, which approached 
each other with suspicion. In many ways the near breakdown of Lesotho’s new 
democratic government began directly after the 1993 elections, which resulted in an 
overwhelming victory for the BCP led by Ntsu Mokhehle.19 The BCP won every 
parliamentary seat, which led to increased political tension.  The new government, under 
Ntsu Mokehle, first attempted to reform the military in 1993, which was met with firm 
opposition. Eight months after the elections five civilians died due to armed conflict 
between military factions over increases in pay, which resulted in the intervention of the 
Commonwealth, The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) countries and the creation of a task force made up of 
foreign ministers from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe.20    
Approximately one year into the new government’s rule, in 1994, King Letsie III 
plunged Lesotho into crisis by unilaterally suspending the constitution, dissolving the 
government and installing an interim government. ,Civilians stormed the royal castle and 
a number of them were killed by royal guards. The instability caused by this event, which 
became known as the “palace coup,” also brought in SADC involvement.21  Shortly after 
the palace coup the democratically elected government was restored and the former King 
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Moshoeshoe II was reinstated and Lestsie de-throned. However, only two years later 
King Moshoeshoe died in a car crash and King Letsie III returned to the throne.22  
These events led to a near democratic reversal in 1998, resulting from highly 
contested democratic elections of that same year. The 1998 elections resulted in the 
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), an offshoot of the BCP led by Pakalitha 
Mosisili, winning 61 percent of popular vote and receiving 79 of 80 parliamentary seats.23 
These election results led to civil war, the collapse of law and order and the near collapse 
of the democratic regime. Directly following the elections people protested outside of the 
royal palace for nearly two months, accusing the LCD of “rigging” the election, and it 
was reported that there were large numbers of duplicate ballots. Additionally in a later 
SADC inquiry into the election, irregularities were identified but new elections were not 
recommended.24 Following demonstrations protesters began to strike, resulting in the 
closure of government offices. Protesters also seized and impounded government 
vehicles and closed the national radio station. Clashes between citizens, police forces and 
the military also took place. On several occasions police forces used water cannons, and 
tear gas, and opened fire on unarmed protesters.25 This period of unrest is considered to 
be one of the most violent in Lesotho’s history. 26 
The atmosphere in the aftermath of the 1998 elections was so volatile that the 
Prime Minister requested regional military assistance from SADC to restore stability. It 
was reported that the intervention of SADC, mainly Botswana and South Africa, resulted 
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in approximately 113 casualties during three days of assault. Of the approximate 113 
causalities 47 were civilians.27 Once stability was achieved in 1999 there were no new 
elections and the LCD under Mosisili led the government. Following the return to 
stability, negotiations began between political groups that would lead to constitutional 
and electoral reforms. An Interim Political Authority was created and negotiations 
resulted in a number of reforms, including the implementation of a mixed member 
proportional system, and an increase in the size of the parliament, which took effect 
during the 2002 elections.28  
The 2002 elections brought a great deal of interest from the sub-region and 
several governments along with regional organizations sent election observers. Prior to 
the election, in an effort to improve transparency political parties and candidates were 
allowed to meet periodically with the Independent Electoral Commission to discuss and 
agree on procedures for the election.29 The election, which was considered free and fair 
by regional observers, resulted in the LCD gaining the majority of seats, 79, and the 
Basotho National Party (BNP) winning 21 seats as well as eight smaller political parties 
winning assembly seats. With the LCD parliamentary victory, Mosisili was reelected as 
prime Minister for another term. 30 The 2007 general election, which was internationally 
recognized as free and fair resulted in another victory for the LCD under Mosisili. 
Although following the 2007 elections there were concerns expressed by opposition 
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parties, about electoral manipulation, these concerns were addressed through legal 
channels.31  
Eleven years after the 2002 electoral reforms, Lesotho has made vast 
improvements in the process of democratic consolidation with the 2012 elections being 
considered one of the most transparent democratic elections in Southern Africa to date.32 
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index for 2012, Lesotho is 
ranked fifth on the African continent.33 The 2012 elections in Lesotho ushered in huge 
changes for the government. This election was the first that operated under a new 
electoral system, where 40 seats were awarded based on a proportional representation 
system and 80 seats awarded based on a first-past-the-post constituency system.34 This 
new system resulted in Pakalitha Mosisili, Lesotho’s Prime Minister since 1998, stepping 
down as Prime Minister, and Thomas Thabane becoming Prime Minister under a 
coalition government. This peaceful transition of power, in 2012, marked the first change 
in leadership and ruling party in Lesotho in 14 years.   
Five measures of democratic consolidation: Post 2002 
Free and lively political society  
The post-independence experience of Lesotho in regards to political society is 
varied. For five years after independence Lesotho experienced a free political society, yet 
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from 1970 to 1993 political participation was severely repressed.35 The 1993 democratic 
transition saw a revival of political participation in Lesotho, despite a number of 
problems that resulted from a lack of tolerance within political parties. Despite chapter 
two of the 1993 constitution (amended in 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001 and 2004) upholding 
the full right and principle of political participation, the greatest challenge to Lesotho’s 
political society truly being free and lively, prior to 2002, was the constraints of the 
electoral system.36 Since the 2002 electoral reforms, Lesotho has maintained high levels 
of political participation among a variety of political parties with twelve parties 
participating in the 2007 legislative elections.37 
Political participation in Lesotho is currently free and lively. Conflicts between 
political parties, that led to the regression of democracy in 1998, which were once 
remedied through violence, are now resolved through democratic institutions. Following 
the 2007 elections, considered free and fair by international observers, opposition parties 
contested the results with claims that the election did not result in true electoral 
representation. During this period violence was generally avoided and opposition parties 
sought a resolution to this dispute through democratic means.38 The widespread support 
for reconciliation resulted in Prime Minster Mosisili, and the national electoral 
commission entering into a three-year dialogue with opposition parties. This dialogue 
was headed by the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) and the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC), and concluded in 2012. This dialogue resulted in the 
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amendment of Lesotho’s Electoral Act and constitution, allowing for a proportional 
representation system.39 The ultimate resolution to the long-standing dispute over the 
2007 elections displayed a great deal of commitment from all stakeholders to further 
resolve underlying tensions. The adoption of a proportional representation system in 
Lesotho and successful results of the 2012 elections have worked to further consolidate 
democracy.  
Lesotho also has a relatively high rate of women’s political participation. The 
representation of women in the national legislature rose from 3.8 percent in 1998 to 7.63 
percent in 2002.40 According to the Freedom House Freedom in the World Report 2012, 
approximately one in five government ministers are women, and women comprise 52 
percent of the national legislators. This report also notes that in the 2011 World 
Economic Forum Global Gender gap ranking, Lesotho ranked 8th in the world.41  
Autonomous Civil Society  
Prior to colonization, grassroots and associational organizations were major 
features in Lesotho. During the period of single party rule and military oligarchy, civil 
organizations were highly repressed. In 1990, as the military regime began to liberalize, 
the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (LCN) was formed and created 
a neutral forum for the discussion of national issues. Following the democratic elections 
of 1993 civil society under the LCN played a major role in preventing full democratic 
reversal by providing continued support to democratic institutions.  The LCN soon 
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became an umbrella organization and forum for discussion for all non-state stakeholders. 
Following the crisis of 1998 the LCN sought to educate the citizenry on electoral rules 
leading to the 2002 elections.42 In 2006 there were approximately 79 civic organizations 
in Lesotho, which included a variety of organizations from professional groups to human 
rights groups.   
Since 2002 civil society groups have increasingly adopted the role of political 
watchdogs due to charges that opposition parties align themselves too often with the 
party in power and do not hold the government truly accountable.43  Due to pressure from 
international donors such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the 
United States government, this norm is changing. International donors are pressuring the 
government of Lesotho to include civil society important decisions of national interest. 
This pressure by international donors has allowed for the creation of a civil society that is 
an equal stakeholder in Lesotho’s policies. Currently the government openly consults 
with civil society groups during the formulation of state policies that will influence a 
large number of citizens.44  
Following the democratic transition the media experienced a greater degree of 
autonomy, in comparison to the level of freedom under neopatrimonial regimes. 
Beginning with the transition, independent newspapers were imported from South Africa, 
many of which frequently criticized the government. However, although the freedom of 
the press has been improved in Lesotho continued challenges persist. There have been 
isolated occasions when journalists have been assaulted and government has shut down 
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media outlets. According to the Freedom House Freedom of Press 2012 report, in 2011 
the government suspended four radio broadcasts for not “respectfully” covering 
economic demonstrations. In addition, a number of media outlets have been charged with 
defamation and been issued high priced fines, which has resulted in widespread self-
censorship in the media.45  
Rule of Law 
The democratic transition that brought multiparty politics back to Lesotho did not 
immediately bring independence back to the judiciary.46 Decades of a lack of the rule of 
law have prevented the judiciary from achieving full de facto authority. Prior to judicial 
independence, which was established with the 2011 Judiciary Act, the court system was 
administered under the Ministry of Justice. This greatly undermined its independence 
specifically in respect to funding and appointments. Additionally the funding of the 
judiciary and the appointment of judges has led to an increasing politicization.47 The 
effectiveness of the judicial system in enforcing the rule of law is further undermined by 
the widespread corruption within law enforcement. According to the Ireland Refugee 
Documentation Centre, citizens of Lesotho believe the police to be one of the most 
corrupt government institutions. Media outlets have also reported that the unlawful 
detention and torture of individuals by police forces is common. Victims of torture often 
attempt to pursue legal cases against the police but further police intimidation deters 
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victims from completing court proceedings. Corruption within law enforcement is often 
not reported due to the lack of institutional safeguards for whistleblowers.48 
Despite what appears to be widespread indifference to the rule of law, the judicial 
system has attempted to enforce its role as the “guardian” of the law. The prosecution of 
individuals involved in a corruption scandal, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (see 
the following section on an institutionalized economic society) as well as the striking 
down of a number of laws as unconstitutional show the judiciary’s attempt to uphold the 
rule of law. In 2011 the role of the court was expanded by the seventh amendment to the 
constitution, which allows individuals to sue to the Independent Electoral Commission 
and submit petitions to the judicial system to reallocate parliamentary seats. This law will 
position the court as an independent branch of the government, outside of the direct 
purview of the parliament and Prime Minister. 49   
Usable State Bureaucracy   
During nearly 30 years of neopatrimonial rule, Lesotho suffered from a lack of 
public accountability.  According to Lesotho’s Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR) 
no reports on public financing were filed during the period prior to 1993 and the 
transition to democracy did not end this pattern of bureaucratic neglect. Between 1996 
and 2001 not a single report was released from the auditor general and in 2009 the 
Parliament was just discussing the audit report of 2003/2004. The audit reports for the 
years spanning 2004 to 2006 were submitted to the parliament in 2010. The bureaucratic 
inefficiencies also translate into the work of the parliament. Laws and policies that are 
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passed by parliament take an “inordinate” amount of time before they are enacted.  Local 
governments also function inefficiently due to inherent deficiencies in the decentralized 
political system.50 Bureaucratic neglect and inefficiencies are exacerbated by widespread 
corruption. The centralization of government activities and the bureaucracy allow for the 
persistence of cronyism and nepotism. 51  According to Freedom House, corruption is 
reportedly widespread in all sectors of government. The widespread corruption in the 
bureaucracy of Lesotho is acknowledged throughout society and most of it goes 
unprosecuted.52  
The government has established a number of measures to combat corruption.  In 
1999 the Parliament passed the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offenses Act 
No.5 (later amended in 2006), which established the Directorate on Corruption and 
Economic Offences (DCEO). The directorate is purposed with investigating complaints 
of corruption and preventing and educating against corruption in both public and private 
bodies. The prosecution of corruption falls under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of 
Public Prosecutions.53 In 2007, the Prime Minster and former Minister of Finance and 
Development Planning, Timothy Thahane, presented a Money Laundering and Proceeds 
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of Crime Bill to the Parliament. This bill would allow the government to combat money 
laundering and the use of public funds by public officials.54   
Institutionalized Economic Society  
The formal economic sector in Lesotho is dominated by government activity. 
However, for the past several decades Lesotho has attempted to create a diverse 
economic structure and spur private investment. The government has lowered corporate 
tax rates from 35 to 25 percent in 2006 and passed a land bill designed to make 
purchasing land for business purposes simpler. Despite the lowering of corporate tax 
rates there are a number of challenges private corporations have in doing business in 
Lesotho, including registering property, obtaining permits, domestic monopolies, 
accessing credit, and protecting investors. 55  In addition the lack of a transparent and a 
regulated market system and the high cost of credit have prevented the financial sector 
from growing. 56 The parliament has been presented with the 2011 Financial Institutional 
Act as well as a credit-reporting bill, but the potential benefits of these bills have not been 
seen at this point. The effort of Lesotho’s government to establish regulatory mechanisms 
to promote private investment is promising. In addition to the domestic mechanism put 
forward, Lesotho has been working with the Millennium Challenge Corporation on ways 
to modernize the financial sector with an emphasis on providing financial services to the 
rural population. 57  
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Economic institutionalization is further undermined by corruption. According to 
the 2012 Index of Economic Freedom, the lack of institutional safeguards for business 
has resulted in Lesotho lagging far behind other developing countries in terms of 
economic and human development. The lack of effective rule of law and rampant 
corruption leaves the protection of property rights in particular ineffective.58 The largest 
case of corruption, as of 2012, in the economic sector involves the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project. The water project, which now earns Lesotho approximately $24 million 
annually, exports water and electricity to South Africa.59 In 2002 the former Chief 
Executive of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Masupha Ephraim Sole, was 
convicted of 11 counts of bribery and 2 counts of fraud. The prosecution of Sole 
uncovered a wide network of corruption what included 19 international construction 
firms. As of 2007 three firms were found guilty of bribery: Acres International, 
Lahmeyer Consulting Engineers, and Spie Batignolles.60  
Factors favoring continued democratic consolidation 
From the above assessment of Lesotho’s democratic consolidation it is clear that 
Lesotho does possess some measures of democratic consolidation, namely a free and 
lively political society and autonomous civil society, while other measures have not yet 
been met namely, rule of law, institutionalized state bureaucracy and institutionalized 
economic society. Lesotho is attempting to improve its democratic institutions and 
deepen democracy. In this sub-section I will assess whether Lesotho’s democracy can 
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continue to consolidate by using four measures: inter-institutional insecurity, civil-
political unrest, repression and intra-societal insecurity. I argue that Lesotho does not face 
a discernible threat to its democratic progress from inter-institutional insecurity, 
repression or intra-societal insecurity but civil-political unrest does pose a theat.  
Political institutions are generally respected throughout Lesotho. Since the 1998 
elections there have been no cases of government institutions competing for authority, 
which might threaten democratic consolidation. The military, which played a strong role 
in the previous regime of Lesotho, has generally been absent from politics since 2002. As 
indicated by the Freedom House Freedom in the World Index 2012, civil and political 
freedoms are respected in Lesotho. 61  Repression also does not pose a serious threat to 
Lesotho’s democratic consolidation process. Civil society organizations as well as the 
media generally operate without government reprisal.62 During cases of protests there 
have been instances where violence was used by police forces but these have been 
isolated. In 2010 the government passed a law on public assembly that required 
government approval for public gatherings but provided less restrictive requirements for 
legal public gatherings as well as more discretion for judges in prosecuting violators. 63 
Intra-societal insecurity also does not pose a threat to Lesotho’s democratic 
consolidation. Although conflicts in Lesotho have been common in the past, these 
conflicts have not been generally along the lines of ethnicity or regional groups but more 
so along political lines.  
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Unlike Benin, which can potentially face a threat of intra-societal insecurity due 
to its efforts in Mali, Lesotho is not engaged in any transnational disputes, which may 
potentially threaten its intra-societal security. However, like Benin, there are increasing 
levels of crime in Lesotho. According to the United States Department of State Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security (OSAC), high rates of unemployment have contributed to an 
increase in criminal activity, mainly robbery. There has also been an increase in violent 
crimes, mainly, sexual assault, and homicides throughout the country. Despite Lesotho’s 
strict restrictions on firearms, arms are often smuggled in Lesotho from South Africa, 
adding an additional challenge for law enforcement. However, arms smuggling has 
decreased since 2010 when border security between Lesotho and South Africa was 
enhanced in preparation for the 2010 World Cup.64 Although crime is a challenge in 
Lesotho, there is no evidence to suggest current levels of crime will be a threat to 
Lesotho’s continued democratic consolidation.  
Lesotho does face a threat in terms of civil-political unrest. According to the 
Freedom House Freedom in the World Report on Lesotho, rival political parties coexist 
with a high degree of tension as seen prior to the 2012 elections. This tension between 
parities is usually non-violent, but previous experiences show that violence can arise 
from civil and political tension, as happened after the 1998 elections. The regression 
Lesotho experienced in 1998 appears to be mostly behind the country, but vestiges of 
distrust remain. The 2012 electoral reforms and 2012 elections allowed for the victory of 
opposition political parties and averted any subsequent protests, while also alleviating 
many of the opposition parties’ concerns. However, the lead-up and aftermath of the 
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2017 elections will be a better indicator of the threat of civil-political unrest in Lesotho as 
a democratic destabilizer.65  
Conclusion 
The Kingdom of Lesotho has made a great deal of progress since the end of its 
military oligarchy. Under the military oligarchy, political participation and contestation 
were repressed. By 1993 when Lesotho began its democratic transition, many of its 
citizens had never known political participation. Although Lesotho experienced a great 
deal of challenges in its post transition period, democracy has survived. The violence 
experienced in 1998 and Lesotho’s regression in democratic institutional capacity appear 
to be behind the country and since 2002 Lesotho has been stable. What greatly assisted 
Lesotho in its transition to democracy was the willingness of the government to address 
electoral problems, allowing for the adoption of more inclusive electoral processes. In 
addition, the military, which was a large feature in Lesotho’s governing structure until 
2002, has generally stayed out of government affairs since then.  
Lesotho has developed a free and lively political society and an autonomous civil 
society. Since the 2002 electoral reforms Lesotho has experienced widespread freedom 
among its political parties and civil society groups. The greatest achievement in 
Lesotho’s progress toward a free and lively political society is political parties adherence 
to solving problems through legal mechanisms. As noted previously, following the 
contested elections of 2007 opposition parities worked with the government to achieve 
reforms to the electoral system. Previously, as experienced in 1998, disputed elections 
caused widespread violence, but Lesotho’s most recent experiences have shown that 
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Lesotho’s democracy has matured. Regarding the autonomy of the civil society, due to 
international influence civil society groups are becoming more involved in governance. 
Furthermore, the autonomy of the press in Lesotho is generally promoted.  
Lesotho’s progress in achieving the rule of law, usable state bureaucracy and 
institutionalized economic society is mixed. Although the government has attempted to 
address problems of rule of law and corruption with the 2011 Judiciary Act and the 
numerous measures to address crime and cronyism, challenges in funding of the judiciary 
and judicial appointments remain problematic. Following the court’s independence 
through the 2011 Judiciary Act the role of the court has expanded. However, corruption 
remains a large obstacle to the enforcement of the rule of law. There have also been 
challenges in implementing a usable state bureaucracy in Lesotho. As mentioned 
previously, Lesotho suffers greatly from bureaucratic neglect, such as delays in 
presenting audit reports to the parliament, and the implementation of parliamentary laws. 
Corruption also exacerbates these problems and cronyism and nepotism remain 
widespread in Lesotho. However there has been come progress in developing a usable 
state bureaucracy. The government has established measures to combat corruption 
including the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offenses Act No.5, which 
established the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences (DCEO). This allows 
the government to investigate complaints of corruption and prevent and educating against 
corruption in both public and private bodies.66Lastly, regarding institutionalizing an 
economic society, Lesotho is ranked as one of the lowest countries globally in terms of 
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economic freedom, which has undermined its economic development. Furthermore 
corporations have identified problems in registering property, obtaining permits, 
domestic monopolies, accessing credit, and protecting investors as leading obstacles to an 
institutionalized economy in Lesotho.  
Civil-political unrest has been a challenge for Lesotho for a number of decades 
and in 1998 this unrest culminated in some of the most violent protests in the country’s 
history. Although widespread violent clashes among political groups have not been 
present in Lesotho since 1998, the continued tense relationship political parties maintain 
with one another leaves room for potential conflict. Civil-political unrest can potentially 
threaten the continued democratic consolidation of Lesotho, but this threat is low at the 
moment. With the electoral reforms of 2012 and the victory of an opposition party many 
of the disputes between political parties have been resolved. In sum Lesotho can be seen 
as a pre-consolidated democracy that is likely to continue its consolidation process in the 
future but as hypothesized by Bratton and van de Walle, possesses authoritarian 
tendencies that coexist with democratic institutions.
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Chapter 5  
Competitive One Party: Malawi 
Malawi, my third and final case, offers an interesting study in democratic 
consolidation due to an abrupt change in leadership and policy direction experienced in 
2012. This abrupt change was caused by the death of Malawi’s then president, Bing wa 
Mutharika, and the subsequent inauguration of his successor Joyce Banda. Prior to 
Mutharika’s death, from 2010 to 2012, there was a steep decline in democratic 
governance but with the inauguration of Joyce Banda these regressive policies were 
reversed. Since these regressive policies were only reversed following Mutharika’s death, 
it calls into question if Malawi possesses the necessary factors that would favor long-term 
continued democratic consolidation.  
Post-Independence, Democratic Transition and Regression 
Formerly Nyasaland, Malawi was granted independence from the British in 1964 
but the independence movement started nearly a decade earlier. Toward the late 1950s 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda formed the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and led Malawi’s 
independence movement. Banda began to garner the support of the masses and by the 
time Malawi became independent in 1964, Banda had reshaped the MCP into a personal 
instrument. As Julius O Ihonvbere states, “Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda instituted what 
was probably the most repressive, corrupt, predatory and violent political system in 
Africa. Through a combination of bribery, intimidation, election malpractice, and the 
suffocation of civil society, Banda not only closed all democratic openings inherited at 
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political independence in 1964, but also erected the structures of a corrupt highly 
repressive one-person and one-party state.”1  
Under a de-facto single party regime Banda began to exploit the weakness of 
political opponents and started a campaign to “purge” the MCP. Banda approved the 
detaining, murder and exile of thousands of Malawi citizens.2 This ruthlessness in dealing 
with his political rivals sent a strong message throughout Malawi that opposition would 
not be tolerated. Political opposition was also not tolerated within and outside of 
Malawi’s borders. Dissenters even in exile were not safe from Banda’s grip on the 
country and were often “eliminated.” 3 Banda created the Malawi Young Pioneers, a 
personal security force, to intimidate all who sought to oppose him. 4 Banda’s near total 
grip in Malawi was exacerbated by the lack of legislative and judicial independence and 
the absence of the distinction between state and private funds. Banda used state funds 
indiscriminately to pursue his personal goals.5 Furthermore, under Banda ethno-regional 
divisions were solidified that persisted throughout the transition process. Banda instituted 
a policy whereby individuals were required to identify their ethnic group and region on 
government forms and in 1989 Banda charged teachers from the north with sabotaging 
the education system by ensuring all top jobs would go to individuals from the northern 
ethno-regional group. Banda then expelled teachers and civil servants of the north back to 
their home region.6  
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The movement for political liberalization in Malawi began in 1992 with a letter 
from eight Catholic bishops criticizing the Hastings Banda regime. This letter was the 
first open act of criticism of the regime in 28 years and spurred what would become the 
liberalization movement. The first independent newspapers to operate in Malawi in over 
two decades began to emerge along with political parties. Although opposition parities 
were technically illegal during this period, two opposition parties reached prominence. 
The Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), composed of mostly intellectuals, and the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), which was composed of former political prisoners, both proved 
to be important instruments in advocating for multiparty elections. 7  
In June 1993 Malawians overwhelmingly expressed support for multiparty 
governance in a referendum that resulted in Banda repealing the ban on political parties. 
Banda also announced an interim government, composed of two councils with equal 
representation among political parties.8 It must be mentioned that during this tumultuous 
period the military was able to maintain its neutrality, and following the referendum in 
1993 the military began to disarm the Young Pioneers.9 One day prior to the multiparty 
democratic elections, the interim government adopted a constitution, which established 
Malawi as a presidential system with a unicameral legislature.10    
Despite the dislike of Banda among voters, he was able to challenge political new 
comers due in part to the strong political and ethno-regional divisions solidified decades 
before. Opposing parties felt such a strong distrust for one another they did not 
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effectively unite against Banda.11 Nevertheless, the elections of May 1994 resulted in the 
victory of Bakili Muluzi of the UDF over Hastings Banda and marked the start of 
multiparty politics in Malawi as well as a decade of UDF electoral rule.12  
Bakili Muluzi entered office on a platform of unity and attempted to move 
forward with Malawi’s development goals.  Despite Muluzi’s aspirations, during his first 
presidential term there was civil unrest, attacks on the media, rising criminality, a 
deteriorating economy and what Freedom House referred to as “dubious electoral 
preparations.”13 In the preparation for his reelection campaign in 1999 Muluzi used 
informal patronage networks to expand his support base. Following these elections and 
Muluzi’s subsequent victory, violent protests took place by opposition parties, who 
accused the UDF of electoral fraud and patronage.14 Despite these protests Muluzi 
remained in power. During his second term Muluzi began to oppress the opposition more 
harshly. Several critics were tried for treason for allegedly plotting a coup against the 
government. Furthermore judges and members of parliament favorable to the opposition 
were also dismissed.15  In 2003, in an attempt to remain in power, Muluzi attempted to 
amend the constitution to authorize a third presidential term. However, due in part to 
strong political opposition Muluzi was unsuccessful.16   
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The 2004 Presidential elections were the first in which Muluzi did not participate, 
but he openly endorsed the candidacy of Bingu wa Mutharika. The election resulted in 
the victory of Mutharika with 35 percent of the popular vote.17 Despite his victory the 
elections were marred by reported registration problems, biased campaign coverage and 
voting irregularities. Following an investigation into the election, the chairman of the 
Malawi Electoral Commission resigned but no additional round of elections took place.18  
During Mutharika’s first term as president he doggedly pursued an end to 
corruption in Malawi. Mutharika led an investigation of 10 former government ministers 
into the reported “vanishing” of $93 million during Muluzi’s presidency.19 Muluzi 
himself was also arrested in 2005, accused of misappropriating $11 million.20 The arrest 
of Muluzi as well as many former ministers heavily strained the relationship between the 
former political allies and led to a public verbal conflict between Mutharika and Muluzi. 
One year after this election, Mutharika resigned as chairman of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) and formed his own political party, the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP).21 As the 2009 presidential elections approached Mutharika led a highly effective 
cross regional campaign that was credited with being the freest since the 1994 transition 
to democracy. But despite what appeared to be an inclusive approach during his 
reelection camping, Mutharika received much of his support through informal patronage 
networks.22  
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However, after the election, Malawi’s democratic consolidation process 
regressed. Once reelected, Mutharika increasingly expressed authoritarian tendencies. 
According to the 2011 United States Department of State country report, the excessive 
use of force by security forces resulted in death and injury, prison conditions’ were hard 
and life threatening, limits were imposed on freedom of speech, press and political 
expression. The report also noted that arbitrary arrest and detention was an additional 
human rights concern.23 Under Mutharika it is reported that the government used torture 
on prisoners, which is illegal under the Malawi constitution. There were also several 
reports of police forces using excessive force on citizens, such as the case of Ulemu 
Martin Nkhata, a former solider, who was attacked by 13 police officers after police 
claimed he was illegally carrying a gun.24  
One of Mutharika’s first acts that signaled a regression in democracy was the 
dissolution of local legislatures, which was followed by the suspension of the Malawi 
Electoral Commission. During this period, Mutharika wielded considerable influence 
over the parliament resulting in the Parliament’s operating procedures being ignored.  
The parliament did not check the power of the president, but bent to the president’s will. 
The public was restricted in its right to comment on draft legislations prior to adoption. 
Furthermore, funding of the legislature, which is administered by the Ministry of 
Finance, was also reduced, resulting in widespread ineffectiveness.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “Malawi: Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2011,” United Department of State, Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Accessed April 23, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186427.pdf.  
24 Ibid, p. 4.  
25 “Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Malawi,” Freedom House, accessed December 9, 2012, 
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In addition to the above mentioned areas, there were also widespread restrictions 
against civic groups and the press. Following his reelection Mutharika threatened to 
implement an anti-sedition and treason law which would prevent government criticism. 26   
Furthermore, according to Freedom House, Mutharika called for supporters to 
“discipline” those opposing him and as a result members of civil society organizations 
were openly threatened and beaten. Following a directive from the government to “quell” 
dissent, there were an increasing number of attacks on human rights advocates, including 
an incident where one human rights activist was the victim of a firebomb.27 Specific civic 
organizations that organized protests against the government were targeted and harassed 
until protests stopped. The police also performed unwarranted arrests on individuals 
including the August 2010 arrest of a cleric who made a public statement criticizing the 
government at a funeral.28  
In 2012 the Mutharika regime abruptly ended when he died of a heart attack and 
his Vice-President Joyce Banda was inaugurated as President. Despite some resistance by 
political insiders the constitution was adhered to and Banda took office in April 2012. In 
approximately one year Banda has initiated government reforms that will serve to 
strengthen democratic consolidation in Malawi. According to the Freedom House 2013 
Freedom in the World Report, Banda has reversed many of Mutharika’s regressive 
policies and established a greater respect for human rights. Banda has also initiated 
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policies to fight corruption, and reduce government waste, which have worked to 
improve Malawi’s relationship with the international community.29   
Five measures of Democratic Consolidation 
Free and lively political society  
The freedom of political society to participate in Malawi has consistently grown 
since its 1994 democratic transition.  The Malawi constitution, adopted in 1994, ensures 
the right to free political participation, and since the adoption of its constitution Malawi 
has upheld the freedom of political participation and opposition. 30 In the past five 
national elections there have been a minimum of five participating political parties.  In 
Malawi’s founding elections there was participation of eight political parties, with three 
of these being considered major or dominant parties (the Malawi Congress Party, the 
United Democratic Front and the Alliance for Democracy).31 Furthermore, in the 2004 
legislative elections a total of 10 political parties participated32 and in the 2009 national 
legislative elections five major political parties participated.33  
Although political parities are free to participate in Malawi, there have been some 
challenges in establishing a truly free and open electoral process in Malawi. The 
aftermath of the 2004 presidential election is an example of how true political 
participation can be undermined as well as the ability of political parties to use the legal 
system to address concerns. Following these elections, reports from a number of domestic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 “Freedom in the World 2013: Malawi,” Freedom House, accessed August 19, 2013, 
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30 “Countries at Crossroads 2006: Malawi,” Freedom House, accessed December 9, 2012, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2006/malawi. 
31 Daniel Posner, “Malawi’s New Dawn,” pp. 136-140.  
32 “Malawi: 2004 national Assembly election results,” Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in 
Africa, 2006, accessed April 23, 2013 http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/mal2004results1.htm.  
33 “Malawi: 2009 national Assembly election results,” Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in 
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sources, including the Public Affairs Committee and the Malawi Electoral Support 
Network identified electoral irregularities, which included the lack of transparency in 
voting tabulation as well as a bias of the Electoral Commission toward the ruling party, 
the UDF. A coalition of opposition parties then took the Malawi Electoral Commission to 
court, charging it with almost two million discrepancies in vote calculation.34 Despite 
what appeared to be a failure of the electoral system, the opposition parties’ adherence to 
the rules of democratic institutions to resolve disputes was a promising sign of further 
democratic consolidation. However the irregularities reported following the 2004 
elections underline the continued institutional challenges Malawi faced in its democratic 
consolidation process.  
An additional challenge to political participation in Malawi is the persistent 
ethno-regional divisions, which were solidified during the Hastings Banda regime, as 
mentioned previously. These divisions brought consistent political gridlock until the 2004 
elections. Following these elections and the emergence of a new presidential 
administration under Mutharika, ethno-regional tensions eased and political parties were 
able to put aside differences and begin to govern. The reelection of Mutharika in 2009 
caused a period of increased political polarization due to the regime’s regressive policies. 
However, according to the 2013 Freedom in the World Report by Freedom House, the 
2012 inauguration of Joyce Banda and her policies of inclusion have worked to alleviate 
many of the ethno-regional tensions existing in Malawi. The creation of a new electoral 
commission and the restoration of the procedures of the parliament have resulted in a 
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variety of ethno-regional groups supporting Joyce Banda.35 Although Banda has 
alleviated some tensions between these groups it is possible tensions can rise once again 
if the political status quo changes.    
Autonomous civil society 
It was not until the calls for liberalization in 1992 that civil society organizations 
began to play the role of political watchdog in Malawi and since then civic organizations 
have played an important role in Malawi’s democratic development. 36 In recent years 
civic participation has been generally respected and autonomous, drawing attention to 
issues of national concerns such as corruption and government inaction. Beginning in 
2002 the government has attempted to provide oversight mechanisms for civil society 
groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These oversight mechanisms are 
purposed with ensuring the non-partisan nature of civil society but regulations have 
resulted in a number of NGOs being unable to comply. In 2002 the Council of Non-
Governmental Organizations was created to oversee the implementation of government 
regulations for NGOs. The council, which is composed of a ten-member board made up 
the heads of different NGOs, has required that registered NGOs provide an annual 
financial audit report. In addition to the oversight provided by the Reserve Bank of 
Malawi, the Council of Non-Governmental Organizations has mandated that registered 
NGOs provide quarterly reports outlining local and foreign sources of income as well as 
the utilization of these funds.37  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 “Freedom in the World 2013: Malawi,” Freedom House, accessed August 19, 2013, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/malawi. 
36 Daniel Posner, “Malawi’s New Dawn,” pp. 135-136.  
37 “Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Malawi,” Freedom House, accessed December 9, 2012, 
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The media has also been generally free and autonomous since the democratic 
transition. The Bill of Rights of Malawi guarantees the freedom of the press, opinion and 
expression. In 2012 Malawi had over twenty-five independent media outlets that have 
traditionally operated autonomously from the government. However beginning with 
Murtharika’s second term the autonomy of the press was undermined. In 2011 a widely 
controversial law was passed that allowed the government to ban any publication that 
was deemed threatening to public interest. Prior to the passing of this law, the Murtharika 
regime attempted to close a number of publications, including The Nation, the most 
popular daily publication in Malawi. Due to the increased harassment, journalists began 
to self-censor. These regressive policies corresponded to a drop in Malawi’s press 
freedom ranking on Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index from 2009 to 
2013.38 Table 3.4 also shows that under Joyce Banda Malawi’s ranking has rebounded. 
Once in power Banda worked to repeal the 2011 law and provide a greater level of 
autonomy of the press.39 Although Banda has reversed many of Mutharika’s repressive 
policies a news report from News24 online has suggested that many of these changes are 
merely changes in rhetoric, citing Banda’s refusal to sign a pledge to ensure media 
freedom. 40  In a report published by Voice of America online, Banda reportedly said she 
will not sign the 2007 Declaration of the Table Mountain, which would repeal defamation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 “World Press Freedom Index 2013,” Reports Without Boarders Online, pp. 19-20, accessed July 17, 
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39 “Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Malawi,” Freedom House Online, accessed December 9, 2012, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/malawi.  
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and insult laws because the media has continuously insulted her and the media has not 
appreciated her efforts to promote press freedom.41  
Table 3.4:  Freedom of Press in Malawi by year 
World Press Freedom Index: Malawi 
Year  Rank 
2009 62 (out of 175) 
2010 79 (out of 178) 
2011- 2012 146 (out of 179)  
2013 75 (out of 179) 
Source: “World Press Freedom Index 2009,” Reporters Without Borders, accessed September 29, 2013, 
http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html. “World Press Freedom Index 2010”, Reporters 
Without Borders, accessed September 29, 2013, 
http://www.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2011/GB/C_GENERAL_GB.pdf. “World Press Freedom Index 
2011-2012”, Reporters Without Borders, accessed August 19, 2013, 
http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1043. “World Press Freedom Index 2013”, 
Reporters Without Borders, pp. 19-20, accessed July 17, 2013, 
http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement_2013_gb-bd.pdf.  
 
Rule of law 
Since the transition to democracy the judicial system has shown a high level of 
autonomy and respect for the rule of law. An important feature of Malawi’s judicial 
system is its Human Rights Commission, mandated with the authority to investigate 
individual violations of human rights, and an office of the Ombudsman, which provides 
individuals with the ability to seek justice from any corrupt or incompetent act of public 
officers. The Malawi Human Rights Commission is not only a symbol of Malawi’s 
commitment to the protection of human rights but also serves as an important mechanism 
for the protection of Malawi citizens. Furthermore the autonomy of Malawi’s judicial 
system can be seen in its use of its check-and-balance role vis-à-vis both the presidency 
and the parliament. The courts have on several occasions ruled against the government in 
cases that were politically sensitive. The courts ruled to reinstate two expelled legislators 
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following their wrongful expulsion from the parliament. Additionally the courts ruled in 
favor of opposition leader Gwanda Chakwamba following charges of forgery.  
Furthermore the creation of the local court system in 2011 has the potential to provide 
increased access to justice for many Malawi citizens.42   
The Malawi government has also sought to address the widespread discrimination 
against women. During Mutharika’s first presidential term a “Special Law Commission 
on Review of Gender-Related Laws” was created in 2005, which created national 
standards for marriage and divorce and in 2006 legislation was passed to address violence 
against women. Although Malawi continues to face challenges in this regard, the 2009 
legislative elections saw women win a historic 22 seats in parliament.43  
This progress was stymied during the democratic regression under Mutharika that 
resulted in a number of abuses of power, which undermined the rule of law. As stated 
previously the government actively undermined legal protections of government critics 
and journalists, who were targeted by police forces. To reiterate, there were cases of 
excessive and arbitrary use of force under Mutharika including torture on prisoners, 
which is illegal. In addition, the Human Rights Commission and office of the 
Ombudsman faced a lack of funding during the period of regression, which prevented 
these government offices from fulfilling their mandates.44  
Today many aspects of the rule of law have been reestablished, despite some 
challenges. According to the August 2012 report of the International Bar Association 
Human Rights Initiative, entitled “Rule of Law in Malawi: The Road to Recovery” Banda 
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has taken a number of actions to promote better respect for the rule of law but the report 
did not completely attribute the improvement in the rule of law solely to the new 
president. The report stated that the President often disregards court orders. The report 
indicated that the legal profession in Malawi has maintained a high degree of 
professionalism and independence despite the regression, and institutions that support the 
rule of law such as the Malawi Human Rights Commission and the Office of the 
Ombudsman have maintained their independence, which speaks to the resilience of the 
institution of the judiciary. Ultimately, the report recommended that the government 
strictly adhere to fostering the separation of powers, ensure that the arbitrary use of force 
by police is addressed, and provide better funding for the strengthening of rule of law 
mechanisms such as the Malawi Human Rights Commission. 45  
Usable state bureaucracy  
Following the transition to democracy the bureaucracy in Malawi has improved 
but it continues to operate based on patronage. The 1994 constitution created the Civil 
Service Commission, which is designed to prevent the politicization of the bureaucracy. 
However the commission has generally not lived up to its purpose, and high-level hiring 
practices suggest that it operates on a system of patronage. 46 Prior to Mutharika’s death, 
it was reported that of the 18 top bureaucratic personnel, 12 belonged to his southern 
ethnic group.47 In addition to the state bureaucracy operating based on patronage, 
widespread corruption has been reported. Private companies have reported that the 
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cumbersome bureaucratic process and the need for an official stamp on licenses have 
made bribes nearly necessary.48   
Despite later regressions in democratic rule, from 2006-2008 Mutharika was able 
to make progress in combating corruption. During this period the capacity of the National 
Audit Office increased and resulted in advances in the quantity and quality of audits 
conducted. 49 The government also created a legal framework to address corruption 
throughout Malawi. A more detailed discussion on Malawi’s legislation that combats 
corruption will take place in the next section on institutionalized economic society.  
Institutionalized Economic Society 
Since the transition to democracy, Malawi has seen varied progress in the overall 
development of its economic society. Since 2008 the Malawi economy has seen a 
decreased level of growth, from a peak of 9.7 percent to an average of approximately 4.8 
percent. As of 2012 poverty remained above 50 percent with a quarter of the population 
living in “ultra poverty.”50 Following the inauguration of President Banda, the Malawi 
government instituted an economic policy focused on macro and structural reforms in 
order to spur economic growth. Strategies taken to increase growth include the 
devaluation of Malawi’s national currency by nearly 50 percent. In addition to this policy 
reform, the government has implemented an Economic Recovery Plan that focuses on 
social protection programs and identifies areas of commercial expansion. 51  
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50 “Malawi Economy 2012,” The World Bank Group, accessed August 21st 2013, 
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According to the 2012 BTI Malawi Country Report, as of 2012 the Malawi 
government was the largest contributor to the economy, accounting for approximately 40 
percent of GDP. The government is currently the dominant force in energy, water and 
agricultural sectors and this dominance of the government has worked to prevent the 
creation of an institutionalized business society. In addition to government dominance in 
the market, Malawi also suffers from a number of monopolies that have worked to reduce 
competition. Although the government has acknowledged that privatization of economic 
sectors is necessary, the privatization of sectors such as the Agricultural Development 
and Marketing Corporation and Air Malawi have been stymied. 52 Attempts to spur 
competition have been made through the passing of the Competition Policy for Malawi 
and the Competition and Fair Trading Act in the late 1990s, which are designed to lower 
barriers for doing business, and protecting consumers. These laws have made 
anticompetitive business practices illegal but the enforcement of these has varied. Based 
on the act, the government has also created the Malawi Competition and Fair Trade 
Commission as well as the Office of the Director of Public Procurement, all of which 
work to support the legal framework on competitive business practices.53   
One bright spot in the development of Malawi’s economic society is the progress 
made in the Malawi banking sector. Although two banks, the National Bank of Malawi 
and the Standard Bank of Malawi, have dominated the commercial banking sector, by the 
end of 2008 there were a total of 11 commercial banks all of which were solvent. The 
expansion of the commercial banking system has been a result of the government losing 
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its direct control. An additional cause for the improved development of the banking 
system is the 1989 Bank Act in which the Reserve Bank of Malawi was given the 
responsibility of supervising banks and financial institutions to ensure a stable financial 
system. 54  
Corruption and the presence of a large informal sector are major challenges 
Malawi is facing in developing an institutionalized economic society. The Malawi 
government has attempted to develop a number of institutional mechanisms designed to 
combat corruption including, the National Anti-corruption Strategy, which created the 
Anti-Corruption Bureau and criminalizes “attempted corruption, extortion, active and 
passive bribery, bribing a foreign official and abuse of office.” In addition, the Parliament 
has passed the Assets Bill of 2002 that requires Members of the Parliament to make their 
finances public, along with the Money Laundering, Proceed of Serious Crime and 
Terrorist Financing Act of 2006, which criminalizes money laundering and creates the 
Financial Intelligence Unit. In addition to legislation adopted by the parliament, Malawi 
has also entered into agreements with non-governmental stakeholders and established the 
Business Action against Corruption (BAAC) Malawi initiative in 2006.55 However, 
despite the government’s best efforts these mechanisms lack the necessary political 
support to be truly effective. According to the 2013 country report on Malawi’s Index of 
Economic Freedom, corruption remains pervasive and is present in a variety of 
government agencies. 56   
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Factors favoring continued democratic consolidation 
From the above assessment of the five measures of democratic consolidation it is 
clear that Malawi’s progress toward democratic consolidation is mixed. From the 
assessment of the measures of democratic consolidation it appears that Malawi has 
achieved the greatest success in achieving the rule of law while there has been mixed 
success in achieving four measures, free and lively political society, an autonomous civil 
society, a usable state bureaucracy and an institutionalized economic society. It appears 
that the inauguration of Joyce Banda has reversed many of the regressive policies 
initiated by Mutharika, specifically regarding civil society and rule of law but what is the 
likelihood that Malawi will continue toward democratic consolidation?  In this section I 
will assess this based on four measures: inter-institutional insecurity, civil- political 
unrest, repression and intra-societal insecurity.  
The threat of inter-institutional insecurity was greatly minimized with the 
inauguration of Joyce Banda. Under Mutharika the parliament’s ability to govern 
effectively was undermined, which threatened Malawi’s continued democratic progress. 
But the transition from Mutharika to Joyce Banda in 2012 was an example of Malawi’s 
respect for democracy and the restraint of other government institutions. This event 
showed that there was a great degree of “political maturity” on the part of Malawi’s 
democratic institutions. 57 Furthermore since its democratic transition Malawi has not 
faced a threat of military intervention and the Malawi Defense Force (MDF) has 
remained separate from political affairs. In a 2012 statement from the Commander 
General of the MDF, Henry Odillo, the General emphasized the importance of separating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 “Zimbabwe: Malawi- Demonstration of Africa’s Political Maturity,” AllAfrica.com, April 13, 2012, 
accessed April 23, 2013 http://allafrica.com/stories/201204130601.html.  
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political issues from the profession of the military. General Odillo noted that the military 
has a role to play in protecting the Malawi democracy and often that requires being 
removed from politics.58 This statement underscores the role of the military in taking a 
hands-off approach to political affairs in Malawi. Ultimately the MDF does not currently 
pose an inter-institutional threat to Malawi’s continued democratic consolidation.  
In terms of civil-political unrest, Malawi does face a moderate threat due to recent 
economic problems. Economic development remains stagnant and though President 
Banda has developed an Economic Recovery Plan, the rising cost of living in Malawi has 
exacerbated these challenges.59 In January 2013 there were widespread protests due to the 
rising cost of living and a currency devaluation supported by the International Monetary 
Fund.60 As of February 2013 the average monthly inflation rate in Malawi was 38 percent 
and the price of staple foods had more than doubled. Furthermore in an April 2013 report 
of the World Food Programme, it is noted that the rising cost of living in Malawi has 
raised concerns about Malawi’s social and political stability.61  I would argue that if these 
economic challenges persist, which cause continued civil-political unrest, political 
stability may be undermined. As observed during the democratic transition period in sub-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 “No Fear: Malawi Army ready to Defend Their Lake, Citizens-Commander General Odillo Assures 
Malawians,” Malawi Voice, accessed July 22, 2013, http://www.malawivoice.com/2012/10/07/no-
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59 “Malawi’ wobbles under Joyce Banda,” News24, accessed April 24, 2013, 
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Malawi-wobbles-under-Joyce-Banda-20130328.  
60 Frank Jomo, “Malawians Protest Against Soaring Costs, Slump in Kwacha,” Bloomberg, January 17, 
2013, accessed April 23, 2013 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-17/malawians-protest-against-
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Saharan African, between 1990 and 1994, many regimes began the process of transition 
as a result of widespread protests, caused by institutional and economic dissatisfaction.62  
In terms of repression, although many indices assessing the year 2013 have not 
been completed there is no indication that repression will pose a threat to Malawi’s 
continued democratic consolidation. The 2012 Countries at the Crossroads Report by 
Freedom House stated that under Joyce Banda many of the anti-democratic tendencies of 
Mutharika have been reversed. The law that gave the president the authority to ban 
publications was repealed and the head of police was replaced.63 In addition to the repeal 
of Mutharika’s regressive laws, Banda has worked to secure the rights of women and the 
homosexual community in Malawi. Banda became one of the first African heads of state 
to openly call for an existing ban on homosexuality to be overturned.64  Although these 
laws have been repealed one area of concern is Banda’s seeming distrust of the media. 
Reports suggesting that Banda would not sign a pledge to expand the freedom of the 
press due to the media publicly criticizing her are worrisome. Apart from not signing the 
2007 Declaration of Table Mountain, the president is reported to have respected the 
media but the future remains unclear.  
Lastly, in terms of intra-societal insecurity, Malawi does not face a threat from 
crime but does face a small threat from ethnic tensions. According to the United States 
Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (OSAC), organized crime is not 
prevalent in Malawi and is consistent with levels of crime of other developing countries. 
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Violent crimes are typically associated with robberies in urban areas.65 In terms of ethnic 
tensions, the 2012 BTI country report acknowledged that these tensions are often linked 
to politics but are not irreconcilable.66 In this report it was noted that these tensions 
typically arise during elections and are not as visible during other times, for example in 
1999. Ethno-regional tensions in Malawi have not in recent years escalated into violence. 
Tensions based on ethno-regional divisions that take place in the context of the political 
sphere are often resolved in democratic institutions such as the court system, in order to 
prevent tensions from escalating. Therefore, I categorize inter-societal insecurity in 
Malawi as minimal because although tensions are still apparent it is not very likely these 
tensions will prevent further democratic consolidation.  
Conclusion 
The democratic regression in Malawi from 2010 to 2012 resulted in a steep 
decline in democratic governance. This regression undermined three measures of 
democratic consolidation: free and lively political society, autonomous civil society and 
rule of law. If Mutharika had lived throughout his second presidential term I suspect that 
the effects of these repressive policies would have further damaged Malawi’s prospects 
of democratic consolidation. However, for over a year Joyce Banda has led Malawi as 
president and these repressive policies have been reversed. As stated previously the local 
legislature has been reestablished, the media has regained their autonomy and the rule of 
law is being upheld. Although I cannot speak to how Malawi’s democratic consolidation 
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process will fare in the future, today I can say that Malawi is a pre-consolidated 
democracy that continues to face challenges. 
The areas in which Malawi has achieved relative success in democratic 
consolidation are in the measures of the autonomy of free and lively political society, 
civil society and the rule of law.  The freedom of political parities to participate is 
constitutionally guaranteed in Malawi and has been a practice since the founding 
democratic elections. Outside of the period of regression political parities have been free 
to criticize government institutions without recourse. However this participation has been 
undermined due to reports of irregular voting practices, as reported following the 2004 
and 2009 presidential elections. Regarding civil society, as indicated in table 3.4, the 
World Press Freedom Index of 2013 has noted a resurgence of press freedom in Malawi. 
Although Malawi continues to face challenges in liberalizing its civil society, specifically 
the media, considerable progress has been made in reversing the regressive policies of 
Mutharika. President Banda has expressed some distrust of the media but this distrust has 
not resulted in actions to deny the media any constitutionally guaranteed rights. In terms 
of the rule of law, despite the two-year regression under Mutharika, it appears that the 
rule of law in Malawi is resilient and the institution of the judiciary has to a larger degree 
maintained its professionalism and independence. This does not mean that Malawi does 
not face challenges in enhancing the adherence to the rule of law, but the maintenance of 
the independence of the judiciary is a positive sign that the rule of law in Malawi can be 
further consolidated.  
Malawi has achieved less progress in developing an institutionalized economic 
society and a usable bureaucracy. A decade ago Malawi experienced a relatively high 
 102 
	  
level of growth and began to liberalize some public sectors but economic 
mismanagement under Mutharika has resulted in a highly challenging economic situation 
in Malawi. Furthermore high levels of corruption only exacerbate the economic 
challenges in Malawi. Regarding achieving a usable state bureaucracy, the institution is 
plagued by inefficiency, which negatively affected the economic sector. As stated 
previously, private companies have reported that the cumbersome bureaucratic process 
and the need to bribe bureaucrats are an impediment to doing business in Malawi. 
Moreover, the national mechanisms adopted to address corruption have been relatively 
ineffective and corruption remains pervasive in Malawi. In sum, as a pre-consolidated 
democracy, these are two areas Malawi still needs to improve on in order to be 
considered a consolidated democracy 
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Conclusion 
 At the start of this work, I proposed that the former neopatrimonial regimes of 
sub-Saharan Africa that transitioned to democracy between 1990 and 1994 do not 
represent failed democracies but pre-consolidated democracies. This means that despite 
periods of regression in democratic freedoms (e.g.: political participation, opposition and 
civil engagement) or democratic institutions (e.g.: judiciary, legislature, executive), these 
regimes show continued progress toward democratic consolidation. I supported the claim 
made by Bratton and van de Walle, in 1997, that democracy in the former neopatrimonial 
regimes of sub-Saharan African will be characterized by the coexistence between 
democratic institutions and authoritarian tendencies (behaviors being embedded in 
neopatrimonial traditions).1 I hoped to discover that despite the presence of authoritarian 
tendencies these regimes are continuing to consolidate democracy.  
To support my argument I assessed the progress made in achieving democratic 
consolidation in Benin, Lesotho, and Malawi, using Linz and Stepan’s five measures of 
democratic consolidation (free and lively political society, autonomous civil society, rule 
of law, useable state bureaucracy, and institutionalized economic society).  I then sought 
to assess these cases on factors that may favor continued democratic consolidation by 
using four measures (inter-institutional insecurity, civil-political unrest, repression, and 
intra-societal insecurity). Based on my analysis, I can conclude that Benin, Lesotho and 
Malawi are indeed pre-consolidated democracies, and are likely to continue the process 
of democratic consolidation.  
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Through my analysis of Benin, Lesotho and Malawi I can argue that there has 
been progress toward democratic consolidation in the past twenty years. Benin, Lesotho 
and Malawi have begun to develop democratic institutions, albeit weak, following a long 
history of neopatrimonial rule. The constitutions of these countries all ensure the right of 
free and lively political participation. Furthermore government institutions such as the 
National Electoral Commission in Benin, and the Malawi Electoral Commission have 
worked to further protect the right of political participation. There has also been progress 
toward developing institutional mechanisms designed to uphold the rule of law, such as 
the Malawi Human Rights Commission and the Malawi Office of the Ombudsman. These 
two institutions were reported to have shown resilience, maintaining their autonomy and 
respect for the rule of law, in the face of Malawi’s democratic regression.2  
Regarding supporting the freedom of press, Benin and Lesotho continue to face 
challenges, but Malawi has seen a great deal of progress as shown in table 3.4. Under 
president Joyce Banda Malawi is experiencing a high level of press freedom that is 
similar to the level prior to the democratic regression. There has also been a great deal of 
effort put toward combating corruption, despite continuing challenges. In Benin 
international and national mechanisms have been adopted to combat a various forms of 
corruption such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the African Union 
Convention on the Prevention and Combatting Corruption, and Benin’s national Criminal 
Procedures Code.3 In Lesotho measures to combat corruption have been enforced since 
1999, such as the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offenses Act.4  
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3 “Benin Country Profile,” Business Anti-Corruption Portal.  
4 “Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offenses: Lesotho.” 
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In the broader context of sub-Saharan Africa, progress toward democratization 
and democratic consolidation has been mixed. The majority of the twenty-eight former 
neopatrimonial regimes that transitioned to democracy between 1990 and 1994 have 
experienced regular democratic elections, with varying degrees of freedom, with the 
exception of Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau. Relatively recent elections in countries that 
have experienced regressions in democracy, such as Burkina Faso, Kenya, Niger and 
Mali, are promising signs showing the resilience of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Despite the 2007-2008-election violence in Kenya, the 2013 presidential election was 
deemed free, fair and peaceful.5 Democratic elections also returned to Niger, and in 2011 
the country held successful legislative and presidential elections. This return to 
democracy followed the 2008-2009 regression in democracy under president Mamadou 
Tanja, where the Constitutional Court and the National Assembly were dissolved, which 
later led to a military coup in 2010.6 Another promising sign of the resilience of 
democracy in the region can been seen in Mali, which held presidential elections in 2013, 
following a near democratic reversal in 2011.7 Furthermore an example of democratic 
institutions being enhanced can be seen in Zambia, where the newly elected president, 
Michael Sata, has begun institutional reforms to make the electoral commission stronger 
and to develop a Zambian bill of rights.8  
Although there has been progress in consolidating democracy, many challenges 
remain. Many of these challenges are attributed to authoritarian tendencies present within 
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many sub-Saharan African countries.9 Tendencies such as the undermining of the rotation 
of political power and the autonomy of civil society, rampant corruption, and the failure 
to develop institutions are widespread throughout the regions, and undermine the regions 
continued democratic consolidation.10 My assessment of Benin, Lesotho and Malawi 
observed that, to varying degrees, these countries are challenged by authoritarian 
tendencies reflected in electoral fraud, repression of civil society, and corruption. In 
terms of electoral manipulation, I observed two alleged post-transition cases in Benin, 
first in 2001 and the second in 2011. In both cases the incumbent was accused of fraud 
and voter tampering. In Lesotho, the government was accused of electoral fraud 
following the 1998 parliamentary elections, which was a key factor that led to the 
country’s near democratic breakdown in the same year. Furthermore, in Malawi, leaders 
have twice been accused of electoral fraud and patronage, first in 1999 and second in 
2004. Regarding the repression of civil society, leaders in sub-Saharan African continue 
to repress the rights of the media in order to maintain power during crises. In Benin, 
President Yayi has repeatedly used his power to limit the freedom of the press, 
specifically in cases where it was to his advantage. In Lesotho, it was reported that in 
2011 the government suspended a number of media outlets for not “respectfully” 
covering economic demonstrations. Furthermore during Malawi’s regression, Mutharika 
routinely repressed the autonomy of the press and even went as far as to pass an anti-
sedition and a treason law, which sought to prevent government criticism.   
Lastly, corruption in sub-Saharan Africa remains widespread, despite national and 
regional efforts. As observed in Malawi, corruption often has its roots in patronage 
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networks dating back to the pre-transition period. For example a review of hiring 
practices in Malawi have shown that prior to 2012 top bureaucratic personnel were hired 
primarily based on ethno-regional group.11 Furthermore it was reported that for 
Mutharika’s reelection in 2009, much of his political support came from informal 
patronage networks. Corruption has also undermined the effectiveness of the state 
bureaucracy and economic institutionalization. In Benin for example, corruption often 
takes the form of  “commissions paid for illicit services; fees for public services (e.g. at 
health clinics); gratitude’s given to public officials to perform their duties; ‘string –
pulling’ or using connections to access administrative services; levies at customs or 
policies outposts; abuse of office; and misappropriation.”12 The need for businesses to 
pay bribes to public official or bureaucrats has often deterred businesses from operating 
in Benin.  
The challenges for the broader sub-Saharan African region are similar to those 
observed in Benin, Lesotho and Malawi. Despite the characterization of elections as free 
and fair, many countries work to undermine the participation of opposition parties. 
During Mozambique’s 2009 presidential election there were allegations of rejections of 
party lists and errors in voter tabulation.13 Furthermore, although the Republic of Congo 
successfully held elections in 2012, these elections were marred by fraud, low voter turn 
out and post-election violence.14 As in Benin, the freedom of the press has been 
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undermined in Gabon and in 2012 the president shut down a number of media outlets.15 
Regarding corruption, in 2012 two high ranking elected officials in Ghana were accused 
of receiving an illegal payment of $36 million from a political party.16  
In sum, the process of democratic consolidation is not easy and often takes a long 
period of time to complete. As seen in sub-Saharan Africa, regression in democratic 
consolidation is common, making progress toward democratic consolidation uneven. 
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have achieved a minimal level of democracy 
where elections are regular and generally free and fair but authoritarian tendencies remain 
a challenge for continued democratic consolidation. Election fraud, undermining of the 
autonomy of the civil society and corruption remain key challenges for this region.  
Despite these challenges experienced by sub-Saharan Africa, I do believe these 
challenges can be addressed. The continued democratic consolidation in the former 
neopatrimonial regimes of sub-Saharan Africa will depend on two things: first the 
development of effective institutions and second, the political will to resolve political 
problems through legal channels. When the former neopatrimonial regimes began their 
democratic transitions, democratic constitutions were implemented without democratic 
institutions. This means that within democratic structures, authoritarian behaviors 
remained common. If sub-Saharan African plans to continue consolidating democracy, 
democratic institutions must be created and entrenched, which will allow for the 
emergence of new democratic patterns of behavior. Democratic institutions such as 
independent electoral commissions, which exist in many countries throughout the region, 
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as well as the Human Rights Commission in Malawi are examples of institutions that can 
be used to deepen democracy. Second, the political will to resolve disputes through legal 
channels is paramount for the democratic success of sub-Saharan Africa. Countries such 
as the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Niger have all 
experienced democratic reversals due to disputes between political rivals following their 
democratic transition that escalated into war. If political disputes are resolved through 
legal channels the likelihood of democratic regression or reversal will decrease 
throughout the region. I am not suggesting that the development of democratic 
institutions and political will to address disputes legally will address all the sub-Saharan 
Africa’s challenges in consolidating democracy but I do believe it is a place to start, as 
sub-Saharan African moves into the next twenty years of its democratic experiment.  
I reiterate that many sub-Saharan African countries that transitioned to democracy 
between 1990 and 1994 are not failed democracies but can be considered pre-
consolidated democracies. Benin, Lesotho and Malawi are examples of how resilient 
democracy is in sub-Saharan African; despite periods of regression progress toward 
democratic consolidation continues. Although I believe many sub-Saharan African 
countries that transitioned to democracy between 1990 and 1994 are pre-consolidated 
democracies, I do acknowledge that some countries have had complete democratic 
reversals and cannot be considered pre-consolidated democracies, such as Guinea Bissau 
and Mauritania. In future research on democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa, I 
believe it would be interesting to conduct a comparative study on the causes of 
democratic reversals in sub-Saharan Africa, in order to identify any trends in democratic 
reversals which may help prevent future occurrences in the region. The full consolidation 
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of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa will be a long journey but I believe that further 
research on the subject, such as the research I have conducted in this thesis, will greatly 
enhance our understanding of this process.  
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